Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/102153
Authors: 
Zhang, Yongjing
Wang, Mei
Year of Publication: 
2014
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper 4956
Abstract: 
This study proposes an analytical framework towards behavioral political economy of institutional change. It considers institutional changes as central government's choices under uncertainty, which are largely driven by the strategic outcomes in a behavioral coordination game between local officials and private businessmen. With field facts in China, this study suggests that institutional changes begin with pro-competition policies, then a better protection of property rights, followed by a possible standstill or even worse rule of law.
Subjects: 
behavioral economics
China
institutional change
political economy
JEL: 
D03
D70
O43
P26
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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