Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/102146
Authors: 
Gershkov, Alex
Li, Jianpei
Schweinzer, Paul
Year of Publication: 
2014
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper 4906
Abstract: 
We study the role of information exchange, leadership and coordination in team or partnership structures. For this purpose, we view individuals jointly engaging in productive processes a team' as endowed with individual and privately held information on the joint production process. Once individual information is shared, team members decide individually on the effort they exert in the joint production process. This effort, however, is not contractible; only the joint output (or profit) of the team can be observed. Our central question is whether or not incentives can be provided to a team in this environment such that team members communicate their private information and exert efficient productive efforts on the basis of this communication. Our main result shows that there exists a simple ranking-based contract which implements both desiderata in a wide set of situations.
Subjects: 
moral hazard
adverse selection
leadership
teams
JEL: 
C70
D70
D80
L20
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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