Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/102053
Authors: 
Michaeli, Moti
Spiro, Daniel
Year of Publication: 
2014
Series/Report no.: 
Memorandum, Department of Economics, University of Oslo 15/2014
Abstract: 
This paper shows that peer pressure may lead to dynamic convergence to a norm that is skewed with respect to preferences in society, yet is endogenously upheld by the population. Moreover, a skewed norm will often be more sustainable than a representative norm. This may explain the skewness of various social and religious norms. By furthermore interpreting a norm as a political regime, we show that biased regimes can be sustained even without the existence of a powerful group with coherent interests. We analyze the pattern by which political regimes collapse and relate it to contemporary revolutions and mass protests.
Subjects: 
Peer pressure
Social norm
Revolution
Protest movement
Alienation
Religion
JEL: 
D02
D03
D72
D74
Z10
Z12
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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