Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/102050
Authors: 
Nyborg, Karine
Year of Publication: 
2014
Series/Report no.: 
Memorandum, Department of Economics, University of Oslo 17/2014
Abstract: 
I explore possible impacts of reciprocal preferences on participation in international environmental agreements. Reciprocal countries condition their willingness to abate on others' abatement. No participation is always stable. A full or majority coalition can be stable, provided that reciprocity is sufficiently strong and widespread. In addition, a stable minority coalition can exist, even with weak reciprocity preferences. This latter coalition is weakly larger than the maximum stable coalition with standard preferences, but is characterized by mutually negative sentiments.
Subjects: 
International Environmental Agreements
Reciprocity
Coalitions
JEL: 
F53
H87
Q54
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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