Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/102027
Authors: 
Franke, Günter
Krahnen, Jan Pieter
von Lüpke, Thomas
Year of Publication: 
2014
Series/Report no.: 
White Paper Series 19
Abstract: 
This essay reviews a cornerstone of the European Banking Union project, the resolution of systemically important banks. The focus is on the inherent conflict between a possible intervention by resolution authorities, conditional on a crisis situation, and effective prevention prior to a crisis. Moreover, the paper discusses the rules for bail-in debt and conversion rules for different layers of debt. Finally, some organizational requirements to achieve effective resolution results will be analyzed.
Subjects: 
Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD)
Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM)
Bail-in
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
304.29 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.