Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/101984
Authors: 
Alkan, Ahmet
Tuncay, Alparslan
Year of Publication: 
2014
Series/Report no.: 
Nota di Lavoro, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei 48.2014
Abstract: 
Pairing Games or Markets studied here are the non-two-sided NTU generalization of assignment games. We show that the Equilibrium Set is nonempty, that it is the set of stable allocations or the set of semistable allocations, and that it has several notable structural properties. We also introduce the solution concept of pseudostable allocations and show that they are in the Demand Bargaining Set. We give a dynamic Market Procedure that reaches the Equilibrium Set in a bounded number of steps. We use elementary tools of graph theory and a representation theorem obtained here.
Subjects: 
Stable Matching
Competitive Equilibrium
Market Design
NTU Assignment Game
Roommate Problem
Coalition Formation
Bargaining Set
Bilateral Transaction
Gallai Edmonds Decomposition
JEL: 
C71
C78
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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