Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/101981
Authors: 
Ouchida, Yasunori
Goto, Daisaku
Year of Publication: 
2014
Series/Report no.: 
Nota di Lavoro, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei 35.2014
Abstract: 
This paper presents an examination of the socially efficient formation of environmental R&D in Cournot duopoly in a setting where a regulator has no precommitment ability for an emission tax. The results reveal that if the environmental damage is slight, alternatively, given severe environmental damage and large inefficiency in environmental R&D costs, then environmental research joint venture (ERJV) cartelization is socially efficient. However, if environmental damage is severe, and if a firm’s R&D costs are limited, then, in stark contrast to results of previous studies, environmental R&D competition is socially more efficient than the other three scenarios (i.e., environmental R&D cartelization, ERJV competition, and ERJV cartelization), although R&D competition is the case of “NO information sharing and NO R&D coordination.”
Subjects: 
Environmental Research Joint Venture
Environmental R&D
Time-consistent Emission Tax
Competition Policy
Cournot Duopoly
JEL: 
O32
L13
Q55
Q58
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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