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Neary, James Peter
Year of Publication: 
Series/Report no.: 
Diskussionsbeiträge: Serie II, Sonderforschungsbereich 178 "Internationalisierung der Wirtschaft", Universität Konstanz 147
This paper examines the optimality of export subsidies in oligopolistic markets, when home and foreign fires have different costs and there is an opportunity cost to public funds. Subsidies are found to be optimal only for surprisingly lou values of the shadow price of government funds and, if subsidies are justified, they should be higher the more cost-competitive are domestic firms. These results hold under both Cournot competition and Bertrand competition when firms move before governments. The results suggest that recent arguments for export subsidies apply only for firms that would be highly profitable even without subsidies.
Strategic Trade Policy
Export Subsidies
Industrial Policy
Cournot and Bertrand Competition
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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