Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/101778
Authors: 
Haufler, Andreas
Wooton, Ian
Year of Publication: 
1997
Series/Report no.: 
Diskussionsbeiträge: Serie II, Sonderforschungsbereich 178 "Internationalisierung der Wirtschaft", Universität Konstanz 329
Abstract: 
We analyze tax competition between two countries of unequal size trying to attract a foreign-owned monopolist. When regional governments have only a lump-sum profit tax (subsidy) at their disposal, but face exogenous and identical transport costs for imports, then both countries will always offer to subsidize the firm. Furthermore, the maximum subsidy is greater in the larger region. However, if countries are given an additional instrument of either a tariff or a consumption tax, then the larger country will no longer underbid its smaller rival and its best offer may involve a positive profit tax. In both cases the equilibrium outcome is that the firm locates in the larger market, paying a profit tax that is increasing in the relative size of this market and which is made greater when the tariff (consumption tax) instrument is permitted.
Subjects: 
tax competition
economic integration
foreign direct investment
regional location
JEL: 
F12
F13
F15
F23
H25
H73
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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