Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/101633
Authors: 
Mohr, Ernst
Year of Publication: 
1986
Series/Report no.: 
Diskussionsbeiträge: Serie II, Sonderforschungsbereich 178 "Internationalisierung der Wirtschaft", Universität Konstanz 2
Abstract: 
A sovereign debtor facing a credit limit due to unenforceable debt contracts may have an incentive to increase its creditworthiness by making itself subject to more severe sanctions in response to a debt repudiation. It is shown that for a natural resources exporting country this incentive may result in a more resource conserving extraction policy at the expense, of current income. A resource exporting LDC thus may face a conflict between creditworthiness and liquidity which would not have to be faced were the source of income not exhaust ible.
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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