Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/101548
Authors: 
Grüner, Hans Peter
Year of Publication: 
1994
Series/Report no.: 
Diskussionsbeiträge: Serie II, Sonderforschungsbereich 178 "Internationalisierung der Wirtschaft", Universität Konstanz 222
Abstract: 
Two signaling games of monetary policy are considered: game one examines the effect of hysteresis on the labor market on the results of the repeated monetary policy game. Disciplinary effects of reputation disappear in presence of hysteresis. The second game compares weifare effects of monetary target announcements to those of a rigid rule under alternative assumptions on the policymaker's type space.
Subjects: 
Signaling Games
Monetary Policy
Credibility
Reputation
Hysteresis
JEL: 
C73
E52
E58
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.