Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/101534 
Year of Publication: 
1994
Series/Report no.: 
Diskussionsbeiträge - Serie II No. 215
Publisher: 
Universität Konstanz, Sonderforschungsbereich 178 - Internationalisierung der Wirtschaft, Konstanz
Abstract: 
This paper studies the implications of various contracting alternatives between exporting and importing firms on the value of production and international transactions. Since contracts are usually determined when exchange rate is uncertain, we show that under some conditions renegotiating these initial trade contracts can be beneficial to both parties. In such Nash-type bargaining solutions the initial contract is the disagreement point. It is shown that when renegotiation is possible, the firm produces more and the expected export is higher. Our results have some implications to well-known results concerning vertical integration as well.
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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