Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/101530 
Year of Publication: 
1996
Series/Report no.: 
Diskussionsbeiträge - Serie II No. 294
Publisher: 
Universität Konstanz, Sonderforschungsbereich 178 - Internationalisierung der Wirtschaft, Konstanz
Abstract: 
National reductions of CO2 emissions as a way to manage unilaterally the use of global environmental resources can be interpreted as the noncooperative provision of an international public good. This paper analyses two basic sources of inefficiency if countries abate their emissions noncooperatively. One is caused by the possibility to take a free ride on abatement activities of other countries, the second results from comparative cost advantages of emission abatements not being exploited. In a simple two-country, two-goods model it is analysed how asymmetries in population size influence the relative importance of these welfare losses by deriving for both an index of efficiency. The efficiency-properties of the Nash equilibrium are compared to the Stackelberg equilibrium.
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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