Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/101413 
Year of Publication: 
2014
Series/Report no.: 
25th European Regional Conference of the International Telecommunications Society (ITS): "Disruptive Innovation in the ICT Industries: Challenges for European Policy and Business" , Brussels, Belgium, 22nd-25th June, 2014
Publisher: 
International Telecommunications Society (ITS), Calgary
Abstract: 
In Italy, fixed telecommunications were liberalised 15 years ago, but the incumbent is still the dominant operator. The Italian antitrust authority has recently fined Telecom Italia for margin squeeze and technical sabotage, proving that the incumbent still has the incentive and the power to deploy anticompetitive conducts. This research studies Telecom Italia's anticompetitive behaviours and regulatory interventions from 2004 to 2012, in order to understand and assess how the incumbent's strategies are affected by regulation. Four wholesale markets (local loop unbundling, colocation, wholesale broadband access, wholesale line rental) and two retail markets (directories and non-geographic numbers) have been considered. For each market, both Telecom Italia's strategies and NRA's actions have been analysed and tracked in a timeline to show the interplay between the incumbent and the regulator and to assess the regulation effectiveness in preventing and discouraging anticompetitive conducts.
Subjects: 
Anticompetitive conducts
market foreclosure
vertical integration
ex-ante regulation
ex-post regulation
price discrimination
non-price discrimination
Document Type: 
Conference Paper

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