Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/101325
Authors: 
Fonseca, Miguel A.
Normann, Hans-Theo
Year of Publication: 
2014
Series/Report no.: 
DICE Discussion Paper 159
Abstract: 
In a Bertrand-oligopoly experiment, firms choose whether or not to engage in cartel-like communication and, if so, they may get fined by a cartel authority. We find that four-firm industries form cartels more often than duopolies because they gain less from a hysteresis effect after cartel disruption.
Subjects: 
cartels
collusion
communication
experiments
repeated games
JEL: 
C7
C9
L41
ISBN: 
978-3-86304-158-8
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
244.89 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.