Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/101121 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2013
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Cardiff Economics Working Papers No. E2013/9
Verlag: 
Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School, Cardiff
Zusammenfassung: 
We show that the static duopoly model in which firms choose between exporting and foreign direct investment is often a prisoners' dilemma game in which a switch from exporting to foreign direct investment reduces profits. By contrast, we show that when the game is repeated there is a range of parameters for which the firms can partially collude by choosing to export rather than invest. In this range, a reduction in export costs may undermine the partial collusion, causing a switch from export to investment.
Schlagwörter: 
Economics
Foreign Direct Investment
Partial Collusion
Trade Liberalization
JEL: 
F12
F13
F23
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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