Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/101102
Authors: 
Lindner, Florian
Sutter, Matthias
Year of Publication: 
2013
Series/Report no.: 
Working Papers in Economics and Statistics 2013-13
Abstract: 
Arad and Rubinstein (2012a) have designed a novel game to study level-k reasoning experimentally. Just like them, we find that the depth of reasoning is very limited and clearly different from equilibrium play. We show that such behavior is even robust to repetitions, hence there is, at best, little learning. However, under time pressure, behavior is, perhaps coincidentally, closer to equilibrium play. We argue that time pressure evokes intuitive reasoning and reduces the focal attraction of choosing higher (and per se more profitable) numbers in the game.
Subjects: 
Level-k reasoning
Time pressure
Repetition
Experiment
JEL: 
C91
C72
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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