Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/101088
Authors: 
Hörtnagl, Tanja
Kerschbamer, Rudolf
Year of Publication: 
2014
Series/Report no.: 
Working Papers in Economics and Statistics 2014-03
Abstract: 
This paper challenges recent results on the fragility of the value of commitment. It introduces a specific notion of the 'value of information' for a later-moving player about the action choice of a previously-moving player, gives conditions under which this value is positive and shows that a positive value of information for the latermoving player is sufficient for a positive value of commitment for the previouslymoving player. It then argues that the value of information for a later-moving player is unlikely to vanish in real-world applications, implying that the value of commitment for the previously-moving player does not vanish either.
Subjects: 
Value of Information
Value of Commitment
Sequential Move Game
Imperfect Observability
Stackelberg Duopoly
First-Mover Advantage
JEL: 
C72
D82
D83
L13
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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