Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/101079 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2013
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Working Papers in Economics and Statistics No. 2013-27
Verlag: 
University of Innsbruck, Research Platform Empirical and Experimental Economics (eeecon), Innsbruck
Zusammenfassung: 
We study optimal direct mechanisms for a credence goods expert who can be altruistic or spiteful. The expert has private information about her distributional preferences and possibly also about her customer's needs. We introduce a method that allows the customer to offer separate contracts to different preference types and outline when separation is optimal. Furthermore, we demonstrate that the optimality of separating mechanisms is sensitive to minor changes of the customer's utility function. Additionally, we illustrate how our results extend to more than two preference types and discuss possible policy implications.
Schlagwörter: 
other-regarding preferences
inequality aversion
credence good
principal-agent model
adverse selection
moral hazard
JEL: 
D63
D64
L13
L15
C72
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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