Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/100933
Authors: 
Ackert, Lucy F.
Martinez-Vazquez, Jorge
Rider, Mark
Year of Publication: 
2004
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta 2004-33
Abstract: 
This paper reports the results of experiments designed to examine whether a taste for fairness affects people’s preferred tax structure. Building on the Fehr and Schmidt (1999) model, we devise a simple test for the presence of social preferences in voting for alternative tax structures. The experimental results show that individuals demonstrate concern for their own payoff and inequality aversion in choosing among alternative tax structures. However, concern for redistribution decreases when it leads to increasing deadweight losses. Our findings have important implications for the design of optimal tax theory.
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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