Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/100864
Authors: 
Kahn, Charles M.
McAndrews, James
Roberds, William
Year of Publication: 
1999
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta 99-10a
Abstract: 
Previous comparative analyses of gross and net settlement have focused on the credit risk of the central counterparty in net settlement arrangements and on the incentives for participants to alter the risk of the portfolio under net settlement. By modeling the trading economy that generates the demand for payment services, we are able to show some largely unexplored advantages of net settlement. We find that net settlement can prevent certain gridlock situations, which may arise in gross settlement in the absence of delivery versus payment requirements. In addition, we show that net settlement can economize on collateral requirements and avoid trading delays.
Subjects: 
Payment systems
Risk
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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