Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/100812
Authors: 
Kahn, Charles M.
McAndrews, James
Roberds, William
Year of Publication: 
2000
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta 2000-22
Abstract: 
In this paper, we consider the costs and benefits of transactions privacy. In the environment we consider, privacy is the concealment of potentially useful information, but concealment also potentially bestows benefits. In some versions of the environment, the standard Coasian logic applies: given an unambiguous initial assignment of rights and sufficient flexibility in contracting, efficiency in information revelation will result. Coasian bargaining may be impeded, however, by either an inability to make certain commitments or by the presence of significant investments that must be made before the transaction occurs. In such cases, initial assignments of rights (for example, privacy laws) can have consequences for efficiency
Subjects: 
Internet
Electronic commerce
Consumer protection
Privacy
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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