Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/100569
Authors: 
Baake, Pio
Huck, Steffen
Year of Publication: 
2014
Series/Report no.: 
Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2014: Evidenzbasierte Wirtschaftspolitik - Session: Industrial Organization V E11-V3
Abstract: 
We analyze a stylized model of the world grain market characterized by a small oligopoly of traders with market power on both the supply and demand side. Crops are stochastic and exporting countries can impose export tariffs to protect domestic food prices. We show that export tariffs are strategic complements and that poor harvests can lead to a sharp increase in equilibrium tariffs. Due to the strategic interplay between the governments of exporting countries, traders can gain from a poor harvest in one of the countries. Furthermore, consumers in import countries can benefit from cooperation between grain exporting countries.
JEL: 
D43
F12
L13
Document Type: 
Conference Paper

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