Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/100568
Authors: 
Sauermann, Jan
Year of Publication: 
2014
Series/Report no.: 
Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2014: Evidenzbasierte Wirtschaftspolitik - Session: Firms and Wages D02-V3
Abstract: 
This study uses rich information on performance outcomes to estimate the effect of bonus pay on worker productivity. We use a policy discontinuity in the call centre of a multi-national telephone company in which management introduced monetary bonuses upon achieving pre-defined performance thresholds. The results show that the bonus is associated with an increase of a third of a standard deviation in the underlying performance outcome. This effect is mostly driven by low-ability agents whose performance improvement is about three times as large as for the average worker. Conversely, the treatment effect for high-ability agents is even negative. Furthermore, we find that other, non-incentivised performance outcomes are positively affected.
JEL: 
J33
M52
L96
Document Type: 
Conference Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.