Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/100507
Authors: 
Böhme, Enrico
Year of Publication: 
2014
Series/Report no.: 
Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2014: Evidenzbasierte Wirtschaftspolitik - Session: Industrial Organization V E11-V1
Abstract: 
The paper provides an analysis of the second-degree price discrimination problem on a monopolistic two-sided market. In a simple framework with two distinct types of agents on market side 1, we show that under incomplete information the extent of platform access for high-demand agents is strictly reduced below the benchmark level with complete information. In addition, the paper finds that it is feasible in the monopoly optimum that the bundle for low-demand agents is more expensive than the one for high-demand agents if the extent of interaction with agents from the opposite market side is assumed to be bundle-specific.
JEL: 
D42
D82
L12
Document Type: 
Conference Paper

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