Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/100385 
Year of Publication: 
2014
Series/Report no.: 
Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2014: Evidenzbasierte Wirtschaftspolitik - Session: Marriage and Children No. B02-V3
Publisher: 
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Kiel und Hamburg
Abstract: 
This paper proposes a screening approach to explain why dating is associated with purchasing status products and conspicuous gift giving. A potential bride searching for a husband may seek to screen candidates whose income is only partially observable. Taking into account that she also bears part of the screening costs, she can sort candidates by offering a menu of contracts that triggers but also constrains conspicuous consumption.
JEL: 
J12
D82
D83
Document Type: 
Conference Paper

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