Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/100166 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2012
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
CeDEx Discussion Paper Series No. 2012-18
Verlag: 
The University of Nottingham, Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics (CeDEx), Nottingham
Zusammenfassung: 
We use a limited information environment to assess the role of confusion in the repeated voluntary contributions game. A comparison with play in a standard version of the game suggests, that the common claim that decision errors due to confused subjects biases estimates of cooperation upwards, is not necessarily correct. Furthermore, we find that simple learning cannot generate the kind of contribution dynamics commonly attributed to the existence of conditional cooperators. We conclude that cooperative behavior and its decay observed in public goods games is not a pure artefact of confusion and learning.
Schlagwörter: 
voluntary contribution mechanism
public goods experiments
learning
limited information
confusion
conditional cooperation
JEL: 
C90
D83
H41
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
654.87 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.