Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/100162
Authors: 
Nosenzo, Daniele
Sefton, Martin
Year of Publication: 
2012
Series/Report no.: 
CeDEx Discussion Paper Series 2012-08
Abstract: 
Recent work in experimental economics on the effectiveness of rewards and punishments for promoting cooperation mainly examines decentralized incentive systems where all group members can reward and/or punish one another. Many self-organizing groups and societies, however, concentrate the power to reward or punish in the hands of a subset of group members ('central monitors'). We review the literature on the relative merits of punishment and rewards when the distribution of incentive power is diffused across group members, as in most of the extant literature, and compare this with more recent work and new evidence showing how concentrating reward/punishment power in one group member affects cooperation.
Subjects: 
rewards
punishment
discretionary incentives
decentralized incentives
peer-to-peer incentives
centralized incentives
experiment
JEL: 
C72
C92
H41
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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