Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/100080
Authors: 
Khadjavi, Menusch
Tjaden, Jasper D.
Year of Publication: 
2014
Series/Report no.: 
Kiel Working Paper 1939
Abstract: 
Many Western countries face the challenge of reconciling future labor demand with growing public opposition to immigration. The dynamics and underlying processes of setting immigration requirements remain unclear as research so far mainly focuses on context-specific empirical studies. We use a public good game experiment with endogenous groups to investigate how different levels of perceived migrant potential and public debate shape immigration requirements. We employ the minimal group paradigm and immigration requirements are set by in-group voting. Our results suggest that fairness and efficiency of immigration requirements may best be described by the relationship between average population indicators and required contributions of immigrants. Public debate appears to foster fair and efficient requirements if perceived migrant potential is high.
Subjects: 
Immigration
Public Good
Endogenous Groups
Experiment
JEL: 
C91
C92
H41
O15
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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