Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/100062
Authors: 
Hoang, Cung Truong
Hüschelrath, Kai
Laitenberger, Ulrich
Smuda, Florian
Year of Publication: 
2014
Series/Report no.: 
ZEW Discussion Papers 14-043
Abstract: 
We empirically investigate the determinants of self-reporting under the European corporate leniency program. Applying a data set consisting of 442 firm groups that participated in 76 cartels decided by the European Commission between 2000 and 2011, we find that the probability of a firm becoming the chief witness increases with its character as repeat offender, the size of the expected basic fine, the number of countries active in one group as well as the size of the firm's share in the cartelized market. Our results have important implications for an effective prosecution of anti-cartel law infringers.
Subjects: 
Competition policy
cartels
leniency
European Union
JEL: 
L41
K21
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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