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    <title>EconStor Collection:</title>
    <link>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/92507</link>
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    <pubDate>Mon, 12 Oct 2026 00:56:30 GMT</pubDate>
    <dc:date>2026-10-12T00:56:30Z</dc:date>
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      <title>Incentives for information acquisition</title>
      <link>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/92537</link>
      <description>Title: Incentives for information acquisition
Authors: Wahl, Jack E.; Tschoegl, Adrian E.
Abstract: This paper examines necessary conditions for a demand for new information to exist. In this one-period model, investors are homogeneous, have logarithmic utility, and must decide on information acquisition before trading starts, and without knowing what other investors will do. We examine the decision problems under scenarios defined by whether information is costless or costly to acquire, whether aggregate consumption is endogeneous or exogeneously given, and whether investors can or cannot costlessly cooperate. In all cases a demand for new information exists as all investors decide to acquire provided the price is below endogeneously determined bounds.</description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 01 Jan 1985 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://hdl.handle.net/10419/92537</guid>
      <dc:date>1985-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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    <item>
      <title>Zur Festlegung von Abstimmungsregeln im Insolvenzverfahren</title>
      <link>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/92536</link>
      <description>Title: Zur Festlegung von Abstimmungsregeln im Insolvenzverfahren
Authors: Franke, Günter</description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 01 Jan 1985 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://hdl.handle.net/10419/92536</guid>
      <dc:date>1985-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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      <title>Basic conditions for costless signalling in financial markets</title>
      <link>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/92540</link>
      <description>Title: Basic conditions for costless signalling in financial markets
Authors: Franke, Günter
Abstract: A costless, fully revealing signalling equilibrium is derived from two easily understandable conditions. The outsidet-protection condition states that the outsiders relate the price which they offer to pay for a security inversely to the supply of this security which they interpret as a quality signal. Thereby they attempt to protect themselves against adverse selection. The noarbitrage condition requires that the exchange rate for two securities must be the same in both primary and secondary markets. These conditions have strong implications for the valuation of securities and optimal insider policies. Therefore a costless signalling equilibrium is obtained.</description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 01 Jan 1985 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://hdl.handle.net/10419/92540</guid>
      <dc:date>1985-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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    <item>
      <title>Der Einfluß der Faktorpreise auf die optimale Fahrgeschwindigkeit von Kraftfahrzeugen: Eine empirisch fundierte kostentheoretische Analyse</title>
      <link>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/92538</link>
      <description>Title: Der Einfluß der Faktorpreise auf die optimale Fahrgeschwindigkeit von Kraftfahrzeugen: Eine empirisch fundierte kostentheoretische Analyse
Authors: Pack, Ludwig</description>
      <pubDate>Sun, 01 Jan 1984 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://hdl.handle.net/10419/92538</guid>
      <dc:date>1984-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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