https://hdl.handle.net/10419/90874 Mon, 02 Nov 2026 17:27:22 GMT 2026-11-02T17:27:22Z https://hdl.handle.net/10419/317786 Title: Is political risk a threat to sovereign debt sustainability? Authors: Ajovalasit, Samantha; Consiglio, Andrea; Pagliardi, Giovanni; Zenios, Stauros Andrea Abstract: Political risk is a significant determinant of sovereign debt dynamics. We estimate the sensitivity of bond yields and economic growth to a country-level broad proxy of political risk and develop a stochastic debt sustainability analysis optimization model with both yields and growth channels to show that political risk can render debt unsustainable, triggered by changes in the political rating level, volatility, or both. In contrast, existing models that neglect political risk would incorrectly predict sustainability. Importantly, we uncover political risk effects in developed countries, going beyond the emerging markets of earlier literature. We establish a positive predictive relation of structural reforms to political ratings, and benchmark reforms against a large-scale quantitative easing program and find them comparably effective, highlighting their significance in restoring debt sustainability. We also establish the effect of political risk on the optimal choice of debt financing maturities. We validate the model out-of-sample on the Italian 2014-2019 reforms, showing that it would have predicted the country's debt more accurately than existing models. Likewise, a simulation of the French 2024 snap elections finds a much higher risk of debt unsustainability than that estimated if the political shock is omitted. Wed, 01 Jan 2025 00:00:00 GMT https://hdl.handle.net/10419/317786 2025-01-01T00:00:00Z https://hdl.handle.net/10419/279905 Title: The efficiency of the London Gold Fixing: From Gold Standard to hoarded commodity (1919-68) Authors: O'Connor, Fergal A.; Lucey, Brian M. Abstract: This paper presents and explains the newly rediscovered and transcribed daily market gold price from 1919-1968 for the world's main gold market during the period, the London Gold Fixing Auction. The paper highlights several novel features previously not discussed in the literature, such as gold prices fluctuating at the daily Gold Fixing even during the two Gold Standard periods when gold prices are often thought of as 'fixed'. It also describes key turning points during the evolution of the Gold Fixing such as its formation and the daily price reactions when Britain went on or came off the Gold Standard. This paper offers the first long-run examination of the weak form efficiency of the Gold Fixing from its inception, at a time when gold was the centre of the world's monetary system. We find that the Gold Fixing price was informationally efficient at its inception in 1919 but by the 1930s, when there was increased buying for speculation and investment (referred to as hoarding) the market became more predictable and inefficient. We also find that the market was inefficient during gold standard periods when central banks were limiting gold's ability to react to new information. Sun, 01 Jan 2023 00:00:00 GMT https://hdl.handle.net/10419/279905 2023-01-01T00:00:00Z https://hdl.handle.net/10419/280405 Title: Alexander Allan Shand and Parr's Bank: Roles as a director from 1909 to 1918 Authors: Hotori, Eiji Abstract: In this article, I use documents obtained from the NatWest Group archives to examine the work of Alexander Shand as a director of Parr's Bank during the period 1909-1918. A Scottish banker, Alexander Shand was recruited by the Japanese government early in his career to instruct Japanese bureaucrats on the establishment of a modern banking system. Following a conflict with the Japanese government in 1877, Shand returned to the United Kingdom, where he used his connections within the British bankers' network to obtain a position with Alliance Bank, commencing in 1878. In 1892, Alliance Bank merged with Parr's Bank, and Shand was eventually appointed to the board in 1909, where he remained until Parr's Bank merged with Westminster Bank in 1918. Shand was not only keen to maintain discipline regarding insider lending, but also played an important role in underwriting bonds issued in Japan and China. In addition, Shand dealt with difficult issues related to the bank's participation in bailout plans and tax-related matters. This article confirms Shand's industrious and conservative attitude as a director of a British bank, as well as his sound management principles in the early 20th century. Sun, 01 Jan 2023 00:00:00 GMT https://hdl.handle.net/10419/280405 2023-01-01T00:00:00Z https://hdl.handle.net/10419/265141 Title: Politicians, bankers and the Great Depression: The Spanish banking crisis of 1931 Authors: Jorge-Sotelo, Enrique Abstract: This paper contributes to the literature on moral hazard, lending of last resort and the political origins of banking crises. Drawing on newly accessed quantitative and qualitative archival sources the paper documents how a bank - Banco de Cataluña - formed a coalition with the Dictatorship of Primo de Rivera (1923-30) in order to depart from the framework of "constructive ambiguity" that characterized central bank lending of last resort in Spain. As a result, the bank developed a uniquely risky portfolio and incurred in insider lending to internationally exposed firms at the onset of the Great Depression. The fall of the Dictatorship and democratic transition, the collapse of international trade, and global deflation during 1929-31 made fragilities emerge causing the bank to fail. Sat, 01 Jan 2022 00:00:00 GMT https://hdl.handle.net/10419/265141 2022-01-01T00:00:00Z