https://hdl.handle.net/10419/85400 Tue, 15 Sep 2026 20:14:20 GMT 2026-09-15T20:14:20Z https://hdl.handle.net/10419/339246 Title: Circular triads of overperformance in top European football leagues Authors: van Ours, Jan C. Abstract: This study examines eight seasons of professional football matches in the English Premier League, German Bundesliga, Italian Serie A, and Spanish La Liga. The focus is on the existence of non-transitive triads in match outcomes in terms of points, the quality of performance as indicated by expected points, and the difference between the two, which reflects overperformance or underperformance. The main finding is that there are quite a few non-transitive triads in match outcomes. Surprisingly, these are related to non-transitive patterns in overperformance, but not to non-transitive patterns in quality of performance. Persistent overperformance over a long period of time is generally unlikely to occur; however, it does appear in these non-transitive triads. Circular triads of overperformance may be related to psychological effects, such as placebo or nocebo effects, whereby recent histories of encouraging or disappointing match outcomes have long-lasting consequences. Thu, 01 Jan 2026 00:00:00 GMT https://hdl.handle.net/10419/339246 2026-01-01T00:00:00Z https://hdl.handle.net/10419/339243 Title: Position values and fixed-fraction rules for rooted tree cost allocation problems Authors: van den Brink, René; Gavilan, Elena; Manuel, Conrado; Oishi, Takayuki Abstract: In this paper, we introduce a new class of cost allocation rules for rooted tree cost allocation problems that is based on the position value (Meessen 1988 and Borm et al. 1992). We further extend this by introducing a class of cost allocation rules that, besides these new position rules, also contains the fixed-fraction rules of Gudmundsson et al. (2024) and the permission values of Gilles et al. (1992), also known as upstream equal sharing rules in Ni and Wang (2007) and Dong et al. (2012). This last rule belongs to this class but is neither a position rule nor a fixed-fraction rule. We provide an axiomatic characterization of the new class of rules, and by additional axioms obtain axiomatizations of subclasses of rules. We argue that the axioms are specifically useful to motivate the application of these rules for smart contracts in, for example, blockchains. Thu, 01 Jan 2026 00:00:00 GMT https://hdl.handle.net/10419/339243 2026-01-01T00:00:00Z https://hdl.handle.net/10419/339078 Title: Mergers and R&D investment: A unified approach Authors: Moraga-González, José Luis; Motchenkova, Evgenia Abstract: We investigate the impact of mergers on R&D incentives within a framework of R&D competition where effort can influence both the probability of innovation and the payoff conditional on success. Our framework nests the results of two classes of existing models and reveals assumptions that are restrictive. In models where R&D effort increases the probability of innovation but does not directly affect the payoff upon success, we show that the assumption of zero payoff upon innovation failure is restrictive. In models where R&D effort influences the payoff conditional on success, but not the probability of success itself, the assumption of deterministic innovation success (i.e., a success probability of one) is similarly restrictive. Across both modeling approaches, we offer a novel insight: the shape of investment costs, and by implication the pre-merger level of innovation, can be pivotal in determining whether a merger strengthens or weakens firms' incentives to invest in R&D. In an extensions section, we further examine the role of R&D input and output synergies, firm asymmetries, as well as the implications for consumer surplus. Thu, 01 Jan 2026 00:00:00 GMT https://hdl.handle.net/10419/339078 2026-01-01T00:00:00Z https://hdl.handle.net/10419/339245 Title: Intangible assets and imperfections in product and labor markets Authors: Bartelsman, Eric J.; Dobbelaere, Sabien; Zona Mattioli, Alessandro Abstract: This paper develops a micro-founded framework linking price-cost and wage markups to intangible assets. Intangible assets, once created, are a source of firm rents. Owing to limits to enforceable ownership and the non-rival nature of knowledge, these rents can be both retained by the origin firm and transferred to a competitor through poaching of workers. Search and matching frictions affect labor mobility and result in bargaining over rents between the firm and the worker. This environment generates hold-up in intangible asset creation and motivates rent sharing. Under non-compete agreements, poached workers face start delays that weaken outside options. Using microdata from the Netherlands, we document higher price-cost and wage markups in more intangible-intensive firms and lower wages for workers with non-compete agreements, consistent with the model. Thu, 01 Jan 2026 00:00:00 GMT https://hdl.handle.net/10419/339245 2026-01-01T00:00:00Z