https://hdl.handle.net/10419/76675 Thu, 05 Nov 2026 16:32:39 GMT 2026-11-05T16:32:39Z https://hdl.handle.net/10419/326955 Title: Skill heterogeneity and market labour income inequality Authors: Medrano Adán, Luís Ángel; Salas-Fumás, Vicente; Sanchez-Asin, Javier Abstract: Occupational choice models predict that, ceteris paribus, countries with higher dispersion of skill will have higher market labour income inequality. However, an extended conclusion from empirical research is that cross-country variations in dispersion of skill explain little of the variation in income inequality. This paper identifies factors related to production and organization technologies that moderate the relationship between dispersion of skill and dispersion of income in occupational choice equilibrium outcomes and that, if not properly accounted for, can bias the results of the empirical studies that explain dispersion of income as a function of dispersion of skill. In particular, comparing equilibrium outcomes from occupational choices in economies that differ in the distribution of skill and in the efficiency of supervision hierarchies, the paper can explain why the US and Sweden have similar labour productivity, but income inequality is higher in the US than in Sweden, and why productivity is lower and income inequality is higher in Spain than in Sweden. Mon, 01 Jan 2024 00:00:00 GMT https://hdl.handle.net/10419/326955 2024-01-01T00:00:00Z https://hdl.handle.net/10419/326951 Title: How consumption carbon emission intensity varies across Spanish households Authors: Basso, Henrique S.; Dimakou, Ourania; Pidkuyko, Myroslav Abstract: The prominence of emissions mitigating policies call for an understanding of their potential distributional impact. To assess this heterogeneity, we quantify and analyse the consumption emission intensity, defined as carbon emissions per unit of consumption, across households in Spain. With the exception of the poorest households, emission intensity decreases with income and peaks for households whose head is middle-aged (40 years old). Moreover, households whose main earner is less educated and male, and who live in smaller cities and rent their main residence, also emit more per unit of expenditure and thus, may be disproportionably impacted by emissions mitigating policies Mon, 01 Jan 2024 00:00:00 GMT https://hdl.handle.net/10419/326951 2024-01-01T00:00:00Z https://hdl.handle.net/10419/326958 Title: A citizen-candidate model of party formation Authors: Bhattacharya, Mihir Abstract: There are multiple models of party formation in the political economy literature. However, most of these works consider individuals as parties and do not model parties as a group of candidates. In this paper, we follow the latter approach and assume that parties form as a result of mutually agreeable links between candidates. We consider a citizen-candidate model of electoral competition where candidates decide whether they want to participate in election alone or offer links to adjacently placed candidates on a one-dimensional policy space. We characterize one-party and twoparty equilibrium and show that no multi-party equilibrium exists with three or more parties. We provide conditions on the rents of winning with respect to the cost of participating in election which also depend on the number of candidates. We provide new insights which explain party formation from the perspective of group formation. Our results confirm the Duverger's law and are consistent with empirical evidence on plurality voting systems. Mon, 01 Jan 2024 00:00:00 GMT https://hdl.handle.net/10419/326958 2024-01-01T00:00:00Z https://hdl.handle.net/10419/326952 Title: A timing game in a mixed duopoly Authors: Sun, Chia-Hung Abstract: This paper investigates a timing game in a mixed duopoly, whereby a relatively inefficient state-owned firm maximizing the linear combination of its profit and social welfare competes against a relatively efficient, profit-maximizing private firm over the timing of entry. We find that the incentives for firms to enter the market depend on the degrees of privatization of a state-owned firm and of the cost asymmetry between the two firms. We also provide welfare analysis by comparing the equilibrium timing of entry with the socially optimal one. When the two firms' products are perfect substitutes, the socially optimal timing of both firms entering the market can be achieved if the state-owned firm is fully public. Mon, 01 Jan 2024 00:00:00 GMT https://hdl.handle.net/10419/326952 2024-01-01T00:00:00Z