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    <title>EconStor Community: Socioeconomic Institute (SOI), University of Zurich</title>
    <link>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/75891</link>
    <description>Socioeconomic Institute (SOI), University of Zurich</description>
    <pubDate>Wed, 22 Apr 2026 17:07:32 GMT</pubDate>
    <dc:date>2026-04-22T17:07:32Z</dc:date>
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      <title>Impact of specialization on health outcomes: Evidence from U.S. cancer data</title>
      <link>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/76209</link>
      <description>Title: Impact of specialization on health outcomes: Evidence from U.S. cancer data
Authors: Schoder, Johannes; Lichtenberg, Frank R.
Abstract: There have been many studies of the volume-outcome relationship. In all of these, the unit of analysis is the hospital or physician. However, this level of analysis is mostly limited to the use of in-hospital mortality rates and is particularly sensitive to selective referral. Moreover, the literature on agglomeration economies highlights the importance of information spillovers within regions (Glaeser, 2010). To overcome these problems, our study is the first that examines the volume-outcome relationship on a regional (county or cancer registry) level. Using data from the National Cancer Institute's Surveillance, Epidemiology and End Results program we find that regions with relatively more of the same cancer type exhibit relatively better health outcomes.</description>
      <pubDate>Fri, 01 Jan 2010 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
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      <dc:date>2010-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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      <title>Renewable energy policy in the presence of innovation: Does government pre-commitmnt matter?</title>
      <link>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/76121</link>
      <description>Title: Renewable energy policy in the presence of innovation: Does government pre-commitmnt matter?
Authors: Madlener, Reinhard; Neustadt, Ilja
Abstract: In a perfectly competitive market with a possibility of technological innovation we contrast guaranteed feed-in tariffs for electricity from renewables and tradable green certificates from a dynamic efficiency and social welfare point of view. Specifically, we model decisions about the technological innovation with convex costs within the framework of a game-theoretic model, and discuss implications for optimal policy design under different assumptions regarding regulatory pre-commitment. We find that for the case of technological innovation with convex costs subsidy policies are preferable over quota-based policies. Further, in terms of dynamic efficiency, no pre-commitment policies are shown to be at least as good as the pre-commitment ones. Thus, a government with a preference for innovation being performed if the achievable cost reduction is high should be in favor of the no pre-commitment regime.</description>
      <pubDate>Fri, 01 Jan 2010 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
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      <dc:date>2010-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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      <title>Rotten kids with bad intentions</title>
      <link>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/76156</link>
      <description>Title: Rotten kids with bad intentions
Authors: Netzer, Nick; Schmutzler, Armin
Abstract: We examine a 'Rotten Kid' model (Becker 1974) where a player with social preferences interacts with an egoistic player. We assume that social preferences are intentionbased rather than outcome-based. In a very general multi-stage setting we show that any equilibrium must involve mutually unkind behavior of both players, endogenously generating negative emotions rather than positive altruism. In a large class of two-stage games that includes principal-agent and gift-giving games, this prevents equilibrium from being materially Pareto efficient. Compared to the subgame-perfect equilibrium without social preferences, efficiency is still generally increased. On the other hand, the materialistic player has lower whereas the reciprocal player has higher material payoffs, so that reciprocity does not increase equity: For sufficiently strong reciprocity concerns, the materialistic player ends up with a negligible share of the gains from trade.</description>
      <pubDate>Fri, 01 Jan 2010 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://hdl.handle.net/10419/76156</guid>
      <dc:date>2010-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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      <title>Trade openness, gains from variety and government spending</title>
      <link>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/76131</link>
      <description>Title: Trade openness, gains from variety and government spending
Authors: Hanslin, Sandra
Abstract: This paper investigates empirically the effect of import diversity on government size and provides evidence for the love of variety effect on government spending described in Hanslin (2008). I argue that crowding out of firms is an important cost of public good provision. However, due to the access to foreign varieties, national costs of public good provision are lower and therefore, public good provision is higher. Especially for OECD countries this channel seems to exist. The diversity of imported products has a positive effect on government consumption, particularly when these goods are classified as differentiated. In addition, this positive effect is decreasing in home market size. Further, the direct effect of the share of differentiated in total imported products on the government share is negative.</description>
      <pubDate>Fri, 01 Jan 2010 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
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      <dc:date>2010-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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