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    <link>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/47454</link>
    <description />
    <pubDate>Tue, 28 Apr 2026 16:54:03 GMT</pubDate>
    <dc:date>2026-04-28T16:54:03Z</dc:date>
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      <title>Estimating intra-household sharing from time-use data</title>
      <link>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/339489</link>
      <description>Title: Estimating intra-household sharing from time-use data
Authors: Arduini, Francesca
Abstract: Estimating intra-household sharing is crucial to understanding overall inequality. Standard measures of consumption inequality only take into account inequality between, and not within, households, because expenditure surveys are generally available only at the household level. I develop a new approach to estimating intra-household sharing, which is both grounded in a general collective household model, and simple to implement with widely available data. I propose using individual-level variation from time-use data to identify the way households share resources between members. For UK working couples, my methodology reveals substantial intra-household inequality, and the poverty rate is 20.59% higher for women than men.</description>
      <pubDate>Wed, 01 Jan 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
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      <dc:date>2025-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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      <title>Focal pricing constraints and pass-through of input cost changes</title>
      <link>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/339492</link>
      <description>Title: Focal pricing constraints and pass-through of input cost changes
Authors: Arduini, Francesca
Abstract: Pass-through rates are relevant in a variety of contexts, such as estimating antitrust damages. It is often alleged that focal pricing, the practice of charging only special prices, e.g. ending in 9s, reduces the degree of pass-through in an industry. This claim has serious consequences, including the dismissal of court cases, but it is not grounded in economic theory or evidence. I prove that, in a simple but general framework, expected pass-through is unchanged by the presence of focal pricing constraints. It is therefore not safe to assume that pass-through will be low in industries characterised by focal pricing constraints.</description>
      <pubDate>Wed, 01 Jan 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
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      <dc:date>2025-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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      <title>Subjective expectations and demand for contraception</title>
      <link>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/339487</link>
      <description>Title: Subjective expectations and demand for contraception
Authors: Miller, Grant; de Paula, Áureo; Valente, Christine
Abstract: One-quarter of married, fertile-age women in Sub-Saharan Africa report not wanting a pregnancy and yet do not practice contraception. We collect detailed data on the subjective beliefs of married, adult women not wanting a pregnancy and estimate a structural model of contraceptive choices. Both our structural model and a validation exercise using an exogenous shock to beliefs show that correcting women's beliefs about pregnancy risk absent contraception can increase use considerably. Our structural estimates further indicate that costly interventions like eliminating supply constraints would only modestly increase contraceptive use, while confirming the importance of partners' preferences highlighted in related literature.</description>
      <pubDate>Wed, 01 Jan 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
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      <dc:date>2025-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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      <title>Multitasking, two-part contracts, and bunching: An application to doctors' tasks</title>
      <link>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/339480</link>
      <description>Title: Multitasking, two-part contracts, and bunching: An application to doctors' tasks
Authors: Rodriguez-Lesmes, Paul; Vera-Hernández, Marcos
Abstract: The optimal design of incentive contracts critically depends on whether the tasks performed by agents are complementary or substitutable, yet empirical evidence on this remains limited. This paper develops a novel empirical strategy to identify complementarities and substitutabilities in tasks, even in the absence of contract variation across agents, provided the incentive contract is piecewise linear. We apply this method to data on the management of chronic diseases by UK family physicians and find evidence that some tasks are complements, while none are substitutes. These complementarities may explain the widespread adoption of incentive contracts in healthcare. Furthermore, our findings suggest that healthcare systems centred around family physicians, rather than specialists, could achieve significant efficiency gains by consolidating complementary tasks under a single provider.</description>
      <pubDate>Wed, 01 Jan 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
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      <dc:date>2025-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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