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    <title>EconStor Collection:</title>
    <link>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/43898</link>
    <description />
    <pubDate>Tue, 28 Apr 2026 10:14:17 GMT</pubDate>
    <dc:date>2026-04-28T10:14:17Z</dc:date>
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      <title>First line supervision without any supervisor: what do workers think about groupwork? Anthropological fieldwork at Volkswagen Hanover</title>
      <link>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/44116</link>
      <description>Title: First line supervision without any supervisor: what do workers think about groupwork? Anthropological fieldwork at Volkswagen Hanover
Authors: Corteel, Delphine
Abstract: Groupwork is a particular form of work organisation typical for German factories that has been strongly influenced by union views. Management and trade unions present it as a radical innovation that calls into question the principles of the former Taylorist organisation on the one hand, and the meaning of production workers' work on the other hand. The workers I interviewed at Volkswagen in Hannover actually develop a different analysis of the new work organisation and of its outcome. Their original understanding invalidates the appellation of groupwork itself. They strictly separate the group: singular form of first-line supervision based on a new normative framework, and the work: the meaning of which has remained unchanged despite the implementation of the new organisation.</description>
      <pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 2001 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
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      <dc:date>2001-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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      <title>The origins of bank-based and market-based financial systems: Germany, Japan, and the United States</title>
      <link>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/44081</link>
      <description>Title: The origins of bank-based and market-based financial systems: Germany, Japan, and the United States
Authors: Vitols, Sigurt
Abstract: This paper examines the historical origins of the bank-based financial systems in Germany and Japan and the market-based financial system in the US. It critically examines the "timing of industrialization" (TOI) thesis, i.e. the assertion that variation in the current structure of financial systems can be explained by differences in the timing of the "take-off" phase of industrialization. The first major claim I make is that TOI overstates both the significance of bank-based finance for the rapid industrialization of Germany and Japan and the extent to which the financial systems really were different. Second, I argue that TOI understates the importance of different patterns of state regulation, particularly starting in the 1930s, for explaining postwar differences in the financial systems. The third claim I make is that differences in financial regimes are dependent not only upon the narrow issue of financial regulation but also on the nature of the regulation of labor, including welfare regimes.</description>
      <pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 2001 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
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      <dc:date>2001-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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      <title>Is perfection optimal? Employment and product market competition</title>
      <link>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/44114</link>
      <description>Title: Is perfection optimal? Employment and product market competition
Authors: Amable, Bruno; Gatti, Donatella
Abstract: This paper proposes a model of efficiency wage with endogenous workers flows in interaction with imperfect competition on the product markets. Subject to economy-wide shocks, firms hire and fire workers thus generating a certain turnover. We show that the intensity of this turnover negatively affects workers' incentives and induces higher efficiency wage premia. Increased competition pushes real wages up but effort incentive requirements prevent large wage adjustments. Hence, adjustments are made with quantities: both the separation and hiring rates increase with competition, increasing the wage premium and contributing to lower employment. As a consequence, an employmentmaximising level of competition may exist.</description>
      <pubDate>Sat, 01 Jan 2000 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://hdl.handle.net/10419/44114</guid>
      <dc:date>2000-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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      <title>Competence, knowledge, and the labour market: the role of complementarities</title>
      <link>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/44107</link>
      <description>Title: Competence, knowledge, and the labour market: the role of complementarities
Authors: Gatti, Donatella
Abstract: This paper develops a theoretical analysis of training regimes as outcomes of a complementarity between organizational and institutional factors that determine firms' and workers' incentives as regards skills. Specifically, the paper proposes that, on the one hand, knowledge embeddedness within firms is the determinant of firms' preferences concerning training, while, on the other, labor market institutionalization provides the framework for workers' preferences. Applying a criterion of coherence between firm and worker incentives, two stable configurations are singled out. The former is shown to correspond to the Japanese model of training, while the latter conforms more to the German experience.</description>
      <pubDate>Sat, 01 Jan 2000 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
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      <dc:date>2000-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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