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    <link>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/40240</link>
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    <pubDate>Thu, 30 Apr 2026 22:15:41 GMT</pubDate>
    <dc:date>2026-04-30T22:15:41Z</dc:date>
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      <title>Aristotle's social choice</title>
      <link>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/336791</link>
      <description>Title: Aristotle's social choice
Authors: Tanguiane, Andranick S.
Abstract: We describe Aristotle's mathematical model of weighted voting to explain and implement decision-making in democracies, oligarchies and the mixed states that combine elements of both systems. This model, originally presented in textual form, extends the known history of social choice theory back 450 years to the mid-4th century BC. The fact that the origins of the social choice theory go back to one of the most influential thinkers of all time enhances its scientific and historical significance.</description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 01 Jan 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
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      <dc:date>2026-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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      <title>Rethinking tobacco control: The global case for differentiated regulation of smoke-free alternatives</title>
      <link>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/340002</link>
      <description>Title: Rethinking tobacco control: The global case for differentiated regulation of smoke-free alternatives
Authors: Lavee, Doron; Steidl, Florian
Abstract: Over the past years, governments have made substantial progress in tobacco control through higher taxes, advertising bans, and public smoking restrictions. Yet, in many advanced economies, smoking rates have stopped falling despite these strong measures. This stagnation suggests that traditional approaches, focused solely on discouraging all nicotine use, may have reached their limits. Simultaneously, the emergence of novel nicotine delivery systems - such as e-cigarettes, heated tobacco products, and nicotine pouches - has introduced a new dynamic. Although these products are not risk-free, they are generally associated with a significant reduction in toxicant exposure relative to conventional cigarettes. Policy responses to this technological development vary: some countries have adopted regulatory frameworks that differentiate products based on their relative health risks, while others apply uniform restrictions across all nicotine-containing products. This study analyzes the effect of these divergent regulatory frameworks on smoking prevalence across a cohort of 42 highly developed countries (Human Development Index (HDI) &gt; 0.83). Using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression models controlling for development levels (measured by HDI index) and taxation levels, the findings indicate that countries adopting a differentiated, risk-proportionate policy exhibit smoking rates approximately 7 percentage points lower than those maintaining non-differentiated regulatory regimes. Furthermore, the analysis reveals that in this high-HDI cohort, differences in taxation levels alone no longer explain the variance in smoking prevalence, highlighting the importance of product substitution toward lower-risk nicotine products in sustaining progress in tobacco control.</description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 01 Jan 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://hdl.handle.net/10419/340002</guid>
      <dc:date>2026-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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      <title>Deliberation in group decisions: Polarization and like-mindedness</title>
      <link>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/319615</link>
      <description>Title: Deliberation in group decisions: Polarization and like-mindedness
Authors: Jachimowicz, Jessica; Puppe, Clemens
Abstract: Deliberative decision-making is often proposed as a mechanism to mitigate polarization in democratic processes. However, empirical evidence remains mixed, with some studies suggesting that deliberation among like-minded individuals can drive preference shifts toward extremes. We use a three-round group dictator game to systematically examine how group composition influences deliberative outcomes. Our design allows us to compare deliberation within like-minded and mixed-minded groups while also manipulating the voting rule (median vs. unanimity) to assess its impact on decision-making. Contrary to expectations of polarization, we find that deliberation moderates preferences across all conditions. This effect is strongest for selfish participants in mixed-minded groups, but also like-minded selfish groups behave significantly less extreme than individuals. On the other hand, the moderating effect of deliberation does not persist when subjects revert back to individual decision-making. Regardless of the voting rule, groups tend to converge on unanimous decisions, suggesting norm-driven behavior in deliberative and participatory settings. Our findings contribute to ongoing debates on the role of group composition and decision rules in shaping collective outcomes in social dilemmas.</description>
      <pubDate>Wed, 01 Jan 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
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      <dc:date>2025-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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      <title>Analysis of the 2025 Bundestag elections. Part 1 of 4: Imperfection of the electoral reform</title>
      <link>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/320437</link>
      <description>Title: Analysis of the 2025 Bundestag elections. Part 1 of 4: Imperfection of the electoral reform
Authors: Tanguiane, Andranick S.
Abstract: This is the first of four articles on the 2025 German federal elections, continuing our analysis of the 2009, 2013, 2017 and 2021 elections. We begin with the 2023/24 electoral reform, which aimed to curb the uncontrolled growth of the Bundestag caused by political developments not envisaged in the original election rules. The reform fixes the size of the Bundestag at 630 members and introduces limits to parties' mandates at the level of federal states (Länder). All this makes the proportional allocation of Bundestag seats to parties less accurate and skews the balance between the two concepts implemented in the German mixed-member proportional representation system - the descriptive one (parliament consists of local representatives in order to 'mirror' the society) and the agent one (parliament consists of credible political experts from political parties) - in favor of the agent concept at the expense of the descriptive one. We show that the accuracy of Bundestag seat allocation to parties can be improved by applying modern discrete optimization techniques instead of the currently used historical Sainte-Lague/Webster method. The balance between the two concepts of representation can be restored by replacing the official two-tier distribution of Bundestag seats between federal state party associations with that computed directly in one step. Finally, all apportionment problems can be completely solved by introducing adjustment vote weights. All these devices are illustrated using hypothetical redistributions of Bundestag seats.</description>
      <pubDate>Wed, 01 Jan 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://hdl.handle.net/10419/320437</guid>
      <dc:date>2025-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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