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    <link>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/4</link>
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    <pubDate>Sat, 03 Oct 2026 00:47:14 GMT</pubDate>
    <dc:date>2026-10-03T00:47:14Z</dc:date>
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      <title>The Asian way of regional integration: Are there lessons from Europe?</title>
      <link>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/3948</link>
      <description>Title: The Asian way of regional integration: Are there lessons from Europe?
Authors: |aLanghammer, Rolf J. |i131678434</description>
      <pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 2007 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
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      <dc:date>2007-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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      <title>Central Asia's comparative advantage in international trade</title>
      <link>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/3799</link>
      <description>Title: Central Asia's comparative advantage in international trade
Authors: |aLücke, Matthias|i133118819; |aRothert, Jacek
Abstract: This paper outlines a strategy for identifying the pattern of Central Asia’s comparative advantage in international trade, based on factor prices and transport costs, historical production patterns, and recent trends in the geographical and product composition of Central Asian trade. The paper focuses on Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, along with Azerbaijan and Mongolia. A country’s comparative advantage cannot be determined at the level of individual industries or products. At the same time, policymakers benefit from an awareness of a country’s general pattern of comparative advantage as they prioritize measures for promoting nontraditional exports or policy reforms to reduce barriers to trade, whether related to trade policy instruments, to transport and transit, or to the investment climate. A comparison of manufacturing wages in the region with key competitors shows that the resource rich countries (Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan) with monthly wages above $100 will hardly be able to compete on price in labor-intensive exports to the world market (e.g., in direct competition with China). For the remaining countries with lower wages, the viability of particular labor-intensive exports would have to be assessed from detailed estimates of cost structures, including buildings and transport. As they are geographically remote, it is very difficult for Central Asian countries to expand exports by integrating into production networks operated by European firms (a strategy employed with much success in Central and Eastern Europe). Enhanced processing of local raw materials that are already exported (such as cotton) will often be a more viable option. At present, Central Asia’s exports are dominated by unprocessed or semi processed commodities. Prominent export products vary somewhat across countries, so that export growth would not push Central Asian countries to compete in all the same products. Many trade flows are also so small in relation to potential markets (Russia, Western Europe, etc.) that ruinous export competition is unlikely. For several industrial products, Central Asian countries are significant exporters to CIS countries, but not to the rest of the world. Such products could be focal points for export diversification into nontraditional markets.</description>
      <pubDate>Sun, 01 Jan 2006 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
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      <dc:date>2006-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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      <title>Monetary management of transition in China: Balancing short-run risks and long-run optimality</title>
      <link>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/3719</link>
      <description>Title: Monetary management of transition in China: Balancing short-run risks and long-run optimality
Authors: |aDiehl, Markus; |aSchweickert, Rainer|i133125335
Abstract: Expecting an appreciation of the Chinese currency seems to be a safe bet. There is a mounting pressure from U.S. representatives, and a majority of economists seem to believe that the Chinese economy is overheating and that the dollar peg should be loosened as soon as possible. Indeed, a nominal appreciation may help reduce reserve inflows and allow for a more autonomous monetary policy in the case of overheating. A plausible strategy would be a small one-step revaluation, which would bring the renminbi to parity with the Hong Kong dollar. However, such an adjustment may provoke additional speculative capital inflows and is not even necessary to bring about the real appreciation. Overheating should lead to an increase in domestic inflation rates above the U.S. level, which – given the fixed nominal exchange rate – delivers the real appreciation. There are certain signs that the Chinese economy is not characterized by overheating but rather by overinvestment. Indications for overinvestment are the strong expansion of investment above 40 percent of GDP, the increase in real estate prices in high-growth regions, and the lack of a strong increase in consumer prices. In that case, the present restrictive policy mix of the Chinese authorities is preserving the situation of excess supply and undervaluation. A nominal appreciation would even increase the internal imbalance, as claimed by Chinese authorities. Whereas the diagnosis is controversial with respect to overheating versus overinvestment, undervaluation can be taken as a stylized fact. Hence, short-run adjustment could be achieved by less restrictive monetary and fiscal policies conditional on the development of the consumer price inflation which should be allowed to show a positive differential versus the U.S. consumer price inflation. Apart from such short-run consideration, the more general question is how to sequence the shift to a flexible exchange rate regime, which seems to be adequate for a large country like China. On the one hand, it is plausible that China should learn to float while the capital account is relatively closed. On the other hand, both opening up the capital account and introducing exchange rate flexibility need a certain degree of capital market development. Additionally, one-side bets on the direction of exchange rate movements when giving up a peg should be avoided. Both preconditions are currently not given in the case of China. The priorities for balancing short-run adjustment and long-run optimality are (1) a real appreciation via higher consumer price inflation and (2) speeding up domestic capital market reform as long as capital controls are effective to some extent. This should allow phasing in an augmented inflation targeting regime and avoiding a hard landing, which otherwise may be the consequence of lifting a solid exchange rate anchor in stormy waters.</description>
      <pubDate>Sat, 01 Jan 2005 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
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      <dc:date>2005-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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      <title>Grants versus loans: Much ado about (almost) nothing</title>
      <link>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/3734</link>
      <description>Title: Grants versus loans: Much ado about (almost) nothing
Authors: |aNunnenkamp, Peter|i133128296; |aThiele, Rainer|i131505890; |aWilfer, Tom</description>
      <pubDate>Sat, 01 Jan 2005 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
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      <dc:date>2005-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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