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    <link>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/39869</link>
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    <pubDate>Wed, 22 Apr 2026 16:57:38 GMT</pubDate>
    <dc:date>2026-04-22T16:57:38Z</dc:date>
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      <title>Local Financial Development and Household Welfare: Microevidence from Thai Households</title>
      <link>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/54736</link>
      <description>Title: Local Financial Development and Household Welfare: Microevidence from Thai Households
Authors: Gloede, Oliver; Rungruxsirivorn, Ornsiri
Abstract: We provide new micro evidence on the discussion about the relationship between financial development and welfare. Relying on the concept of local financial development our analysis focuses on three dimensions of household welfare: vulnerability to poverty, investment, and consumption smoothing. Even though we cannot find a significant effect on vulnerability, we provide evidence that financial development is correlated with higher investment and better possibilities to smooth consumption. The extent of both effects is also economically significant. Our results hold for alternative specifications and variations in the measurement of financial development.</description>
      <pubDate>Sun, 01 Jan 2012 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
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      <dc:date>2012-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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      <title>A household-based Human Development Index</title>
      <link>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/39994</link>
      <description>Title: A household-based Human Development Index
Authors: Harttgen, Kenneth; Klasen, Stephan
Abstract: One of the most serious weaknesses of the human development index (HDI) is that it considers only average achievements and does not take into account the distribution of human development within a country or by population subgroups. All previous attempts to capture inequality in the HDI have also used aggregate information and there exists no HDI at the household level. This paper provides a method and illustration for calculating the HDI at the household level. This immediately allows the analysis of the HDI by any kind of population subgroups and by household socioeconomic characteristics. Furthermore, it allows to apply any kind of inequality measure to the HDI across population subgroups and over time. We illustrate our approach for 15 developing countries. Inequality in the HDI is largest in poorer countries, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa. We also find large inequalities within countries between population subgroups, particularly by income, location, and education of the household head. We also find considerable inequality when looking at inequality measures like the Theil or the Gini coefficient; within-group inequality is, however, invariably larger than between-group inequality and inequality in the HDI within countries is of similar order of magnitude of inequality in the HDI between countries.</description>
      <pubDate>Fri, 01 Jan 2010 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
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      <dc:date>2010-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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      <title>Mode of Entry and Expropriation</title>
      <link>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/40004</link>
      <description>Title: Mode of Entry and Expropriation
Authors: Dadasov, Ramin; Lorz, Jens Oliver
Abstract: We develop a politico-economic model to analyze the relationship between mode of entry into a new market and institutional quality of the host country. A foreign investor can either purchase a domestic firm, what we consider as FDI, or form a joint venture, in which the control right over the firm rests with the domestic entrepreneur. In an autocratic regime, the ruling elite uses its political power to implement expropriatory policies. In an integrated firm the risk of expropriation targets the foreign investor whereas in a joint venture the domestic agent bears this risk. We determine the equilibrium level of the probability of expropriation and show that the ruling elite, by choosing it, discriminates in favor of the foreign investor. This has implications for the form of invested capital, and thus for the organizational structure of active firms in the host country.</description>
      <pubDate>Fri, 01 Jan 2010 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://hdl.handle.net/10419/40004</guid>
      <dc:date>2010-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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      <title>Contract Enforcement by the Gods</title>
      <link>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/40013</link>
      <description>Title: Contract Enforcement by the Gods
Authors: Schumacher, Heiner; Hadnes, Myriam
Abstract: We propose a theory that explains why rational agents start to believe in a causal relationship between unrelated events. Agents send and collect messages through a communication network. If they are convinced of a relationship between two events, they send messages confirming their belief with higher probability than messages contradicting it. The network aggregates this communication bias over individuals. Therefore, agents may find a strong relationship between unrelated events even if the communication bias is very small. We apply this model to an informal economy where the fear of punishment by supernatural forces prevents agents from cheating others.</description>
      <pubDate>Fri, 01 Jan 2010 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
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      <dc:date>2010-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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