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    <title>EconStor Collection:</title>
    <link>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/313901</link>
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    <pubDate>Sun, 22 Nov 2026 21:22:40 GMT</pubDate>
    <dc:date>2026-11-22T21:22:40Z</dc:date>
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      <title>Just stop oil? The economic and environmental consequences of ending domestic oil and gas production</title>
      <link>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/337449</link>
      <description>Title: Just stop oil? The economic and environmental consequences of ending domestic oil and gas production
Authors: Porter, Kathryn
Abstract: * No credible forecast shows UK oil and gas demand falling to zero by 2050, even under net zero scenarios - oil and gas are essential ingredients in plastics, fertilisers, medicines and modern technology * The 78% headline tax rate is forcing a decline in North Sea production and driving investment overseas, with the workforce forecast to halve to as low as 57,000 by the early 2030s - losing up to 1,000 jobs a month * Replacing domestic production with imports increases overall emissions by around 50% and risks gas shortages on cold winter days as early as 2026/27</description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 01 Jan 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
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      <dc:date>2026-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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      <title>Is flexible working? The costs and benefits of flexible working and the drawbacks of one-size-fits-all flexibility mandates</title>
      <link>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/336788</link>
      <description>Title: Is flexible working? The costs and benefits of flexible working and the drawbacks of one-size-fits-all flexibility mandates
Authors: Denham, Annabel; Shackleton, J. R.
Abstract: Changes to our way of life during the Covid lockdown accelerated an existing drive for more flexible working opportunities. However, the costs of flexible working requirements have rarely been properly assessed and could extend to undermining growth, increasing unemployment and the rise in post-Covid withdrawal from the workforce. UK employers already offer a wide variety of non-traditional work options. Where this is the result of employers voluntarily offering such options and workers voluntarily accepting them, this is compatible with classical liberal approaches to the employment contract and economic efficiency. The rationale for the 'right to request' flexible working has expanded from concern for economically disadvantaged workers with health issues or caring responsibilities to a belief that all employees should be able to request a change to their working arrangements. The Employment Rights Act strengthens the 'right to request' flexible working arrangements and will make it very difficult for organisations to resist such requests. Flexible working arrangements advocated by pressure groups and trade unions include the right to work at home, to work compressed hours or a four-day week, a 'right to disconnect' and extended and more generously funded parental leave. All of these arrangements have bene ts for some employees, and a monetary value can be attached to them. However, as other employees cannot bene t from these opportunities because of the nature of their jobs, pay relativities may need to adjust, and this could present difficulties where pay structures are rigid as a result of union pressures. Despite claims that flexible working is virtually costless to employers, this is not generally true; otherwise, flexible options would be offered voluntarily. Where employers face significant extra costs, these will be passed on to consumers in the form of higher prices and to workers in terms of lower wages and/or fewer job opportunities. A concern is the way in which effective employment mandates arising from tribunal decisions or further regulatory interventions may particularly benefit already privileged public sector employees. The costs fall on the taxpayer, and such mandates may undermine attempts to improve poor productivity performance. They will also make it still more difficult for private employers to compete. We are not in a position to evaluate the benefits and costs of particular working arrangements. But neither are politicians and civil servants. Employers and employees, negotiating in the 'particular circumstances of time and place', are better suited to undertake these evaluations. Government should take its hand from the tiller and allow businesses and employees to come to arrangements that best suit their own needs and requirements.</description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 01 Jan 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
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      <dc:date>2026-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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      <title>A taxing inheritance: The state of Britain's inheritance tax system - is reform enough?</title>
      <link>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/339580</link>
      <description>Title: A taxing inheritance: The state of Britain's inheritance tax system - is reform enough?
Authors: Meakin, Rory
Abstract: Inheritance tax is levied on the estates of the deceased, including on lifetime gifts made up to seven years prior to death. Roman emperors levied taxes on inheritances, and the British history goes back to the Stamp Act 1694, later modernised by the Finance Act 1894 with the introduction of the estate duty. Rates were initially low with a top rate of 8% on estates worth over £1 million (£116 million in 2025 prices). But they rose precipitously over the 20th century to reach 85% before being renamed as capital transfer tax, applying to lifetime gifts, before reverting back to a tax on death estates only in the mid-1980s and being renamed again as today's inheritance tax at a single headline rate of 40%. Britain's top headline rate of 40% is only moderately above the median rate among OECD countries which levy a tax, Czechia's 35%. But 18 out of the 38 OECD countries, almost half, do not levy a tax on bequests to adult children of the deceased, and 10 charge preferential rates. Including these countries and those without a tax at all, Britain ranks fifth highest and is in a small group of high-tax outliers. Much policy-expert commentary on the question of inheritance tax being a 'double' tax is mistaken, and the general public are closer to the truth. It may strictly speaking not be a 'double' tax given all the others that apply, but it is arbitrary, additional and distortionary. The correct lens to consider the question is the value chain from creation to consumption; inheritance tax somewhat arbitrarily introduces an additional point of taxation into the chain. The only way to make an inheritance tax neutral would be to implement a retrospective matching tax rebate for taxed income originally received by the benefactor. Inheritance tax is particularly complex and costly to administer, but its effects on savings and investment and redistribution are more ambiguous, as is public opinion on the question of how to reform it. The public considers it to be unfair, and there is a large majority in favour of reducing it, and sometimes of abolishing it. But that opinion appears to weaken significantly when set against alternative taxes to cut instead. There is a good case for abolishing inheritance tax entirely due to its arbitrary and distortionary nature, its complexity, its effect on savings and investment, its effect on Britain's international competitiveness in attracting entrepreneurs and the very rich, and satisfying public opinion. But it is harder to make the case for abolition as a policy priority above other alternative tax cuts which might deliver greater effects on incentives when governments are unwilling to restrain spending enough to allow both. More incremental reforms offer significantly weaker tax simplification, neutrality and efficiency benefits but come with smaller foregone revenues for the exchequer and represent a smaller opportunity cost in terms of alternative potential tax reforms.</description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 01 Jan 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
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      <dc:date>2026-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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      <title>A growth mindset? Public understanding of British economic performance and attitudes to pro-growth policies</title>
      <link>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/340036</link>
      <description>Title: A growth mindset? Public understanding of British economic performance and attitudes to pro-growth policies
Authors: Lesh, Matthew; Turner, Michael
Abstract: Britain is experiencing a prolonged period of economic stagnation, if not decline. Most people believe living standards have declined and that the country is heading in the wrong direction. Support for economic growth is broad and deep, spanning all age groups, regions and political affiliations, with most Britons believing the UK should place greater priority on growth. There is no public appetite for 'degrowth' narratives. However, many voters do not clearly grasp what economic growth means, what drives it, or why it matters. Younger voters in particular often struggle to connect growth with the benefits of productivity, business investment, and rising living standards. The public also remains sceptical about who benefits. While most people believe growth matters in principle, many worry that much of the gain will go to someone else - namely, government, big business and higher earners - rather than to themselves, their families and their communities. Although voters recognise that the economy is weak, they underestimate the scale of Britain's relative decline compared to peer economies and the United States. When confronted with the true picture, they react with shock and embarrassment, creating an emotional jolt that increases openness to change. Public opinion on the causes of stagnation is often confused and contradictory. Voters support market-orientated explanations for low growth, such as too-high taxes, too- 8 high energy costs, and excessive red tape, but they also endorse more interventionist strategies for achieving high levels of growth. This reflects a broader 'kitchen sink' mindset: wanting to throw everything at the problem. People distrust politicians and government, often blaming them for economic decline, yet still instinctively look to the state to fix the problem. This leads to frustration without a coherent diagnosis. Even so, there is real openness to pro-growth reform. A majority of Brits support measures such as reducing energy costs, cutting taxes, and easing regulation, especially when framed as resulting in lower bills, higher wages, more homes, and better public services. The biggest political obstacles to support for pro-growth measures are perceptions around fairness. Anti-growth arguments gain traction when people believe growth will deliver greater benefits to others, especially the wealthy, while imposing potential costs or greater risks on ordinary workers and families. Voters distrust big business and significantly overestimate profits, holding the belief that economic growth benefits corporations at the expense of consumers. Bridging this gap by emphasising the role of businesses in creating jobs, delivering prosperity, and boosting innovation, is key to building a credible case for economic growth. The central strategic lesson is that the case for growth must be practical rather than abstract, grounded in tangible benefits. To build a durable mandate for reform, growth must be linked directly to personal and local benefits, while it is made clear that Britain's stagnation is the result of barriers that can be removed, failures that can be reversed and political choices that can be changed.</description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 01 Jan 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
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      <dc:date>2026-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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