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    <link>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/299</link>
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    <pubDate>Tue, 06 Oct 2026 06:25:00 GMT</pubDate>
    <dc:date>2026-10-06T06:25:00Z</dc:date>
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      <title>Production networks in East Asia: strategic behavior by Japanese and US firms</title>
      <link>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/31431</link>
      <description>Title: Production networks in East Asia: strategic behavior by Japanese and US firms
Authors: Arndt, Sven W.; Ando, Mitsuyo; Kimura, Fukunari</description>
      <pubDate>Sun, 01 Jan 2006 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
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      <dc:date>2006-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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      <title>Corporate philanthropic practices</title>
      <link>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/31432</link>
      <description>Title: Corporate philanthropic practices
Authors: Brown, William O.; Helland, Eric; Smith, Janet Kiholm
Abstract: We study corporate philanthropy using an original database that includes firm-level data on dollar giving, giving priorities, governance, and managerial involvement in giving programs. Results provide some support for the theory that giving enhances shareholder value, as firms in the same industry tend to adopt similar giving practices and firms that advertise more intensively also give more to charity. But much of our evidence indicates that agency costs play a prominent role in explaining corporate giving. Firms with larger boards of directors are associated with significantly more cash giving and with the establishment of corporate foundations. Consistent with effective monitoring by creditors, firms with higher debt-to-value ratios give less cash to charities and are less likely to establish foundations. The empirical work considers the impact of industry regulation on giving and controls for state philanthropy laws and fiduciary responsibility laws.</description>
      <pubDate>Sun, 01 Jan 2006 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
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      <dc:date>2006-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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      <title>The Doha Development Round: reaching beyond trade liberalization</title>
      <link>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/31453</link>
      <description>Title: The Doha Development Round: reaching beyond trade liberalization
Authors: Arndt, Sven W.</description>
      <pubDate>Sun, 01 Jan 2006 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
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      <dc:date>2006-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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      <title>The (after) life-cycle theory of religious contributions</title>
      <link>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/31416</link>
      <description>Title: The (after) life-cycle theory of religious contributions
Authors: Blomberg, S. Brock; DeLeire, Thomas; Hess, Gregory D.
Abstract: We construct and estimate an economic model of religious giving. We employ a dynamic consumer optimization model with mortality in which intra-temporal utility stems from both consumption and religious contributions. Individuals also decide how to allocate resources between religious contributions (which have both a this-life consumption value and an after-life investment value) and other consumption expenditures. If religious contributions do not have an after-life investment value, the ratio of contributions to consumption expenditures should be unrelated to the probability of death. However, if there is an investment value from religious giving, individuals should allocate a greater share of their income to religious contributions as their probability of death increases. We estimate the model using data from the Consumer Expenditure Survey on the consumption and religious contribution patterns of a repeated cross-section of households and of a synthetic cohort panel. We find strong evidence that individuals behave as if religious contributions have a value in the after-life, in a manner consistent with the after life-cycle model. The estimates of the structural parameters of the model also imply that while after-life investment considerations (i.e. impending death) are an important determinant of the life-cycle profile of religious contributions, within-life (i.e. religious consumption) factors pin down a household's average level of religious contributions over a lifetime.</description>
      <pubDate>Sun, 01 Jan 2006 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
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      <dc:date>2006-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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