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    <link>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/282</link>
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    <pubDate>Sun, 15 Nov 2026 02:09:33 GMT</pubDate>
    <dc:date>2026-11-15T02:09:33Z</dc:date>
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      <title>Default and interest rate shocks: Renegotiation matters</title>
      <link>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/284000</link>
      <description>Title: Default and interest rate shocks: Renegotiation matters
Authors: Almeida, Victor; Esquivel, Carlos; Kehoe, Timothy Jerome; Nicolini, Juan Pablo
Abstract: We develop a sovereign default model with debt renegotiation in which interest-rate shocks affect default incentives through two mechanisms. The first is the standard mechanism through which higher rates tighten the budget constraint. The second rests on how risk-free rates affect lenders' opportunity cost of holding delinquent debt. When rates are high, this cost increases and lenders accept larger haircuts, which makes default more attractive ex-ante. We use the model to study the 1982 Mexican default, which followed a large increase in US interest rates. Our novel renegotiation mechanism is key for reconciling sovereign default models with the narrative that US monetary tightening triggered the crisis.</description>
      <pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 2024 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
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      <dc:date>2024-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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      <title>Sovereign risk and Dutch disease</title>
      <link>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/283998</link>
      <description>Title: Sovereign risk and Dutch disease
Authors: Esquivel, Carlos
Abstract: I study how, in the presence of default risk, the Dutch disease amplifies an inefficiency in the sectoral allocation of capital. I develop a sovereign default model with production of tradable and non-tradable goods, and endowments of commodities. Default incentives increase when more capital is allocated to non-traded production. Households do not internalize this effect, giving rise to over-investment in the non-traded sector. Commodity windfalls amplify this inefficiency through the classic Dutch disease mechanism and an increased desire to borrow. Policies that reduce the returns of non-traded capital, such as exchange rate sterilization, ameliorate the degree of over-investment during commodity windfalls. Evidence from spreads, commodity endowments, and exchange rate data supports the main findings of the model.</description>
      <pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 2024 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
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      <dc:date>2024-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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      <title>Expansionary fiscal consolidation under sovereign risk</title>
      <link>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/283996</link>
      <description>Title: Expansionary fiscal consolidation under sovereign risk
Authors: Esquivel, Carlos; Samano, Agustin
Abstract: We study how debt limits can be expansionary in economies facing sovereign risk. We develop a sovereign debt model with capital accumulation, long-term debt, and fiscal rules that features two distortions: debt dilution and a pecuniary externality of private investment on spreads. The optimal debt limit increases capital accumulation due to lower sovereign risk, generating an economic expansion in the long run. Welfare gains are a result of lower sovereign spreads due to expectations about future borrowing and investment. We present evidence of a positive (negative) relation between debt limits and investment (spreads), consistent with the predictions of the model.</description>
      <pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 2024 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
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      <dc:date>2024-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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      <title>Underinvestment and capital misallocation under sovereign risk</title>
      <link>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/283997</link>
      <description>Title: Underinvestment and capital misallocation under sovereign risk
Authors: Esquivel, Carlos
Abstract: Capital and its sectoral allocation affect default incentives. Under general assumptions, default risk is decreasing in the total stock of capital and increasing in the share of capital allocated to non-tradable production. This implies that when competitive households make all investment decisions capital has two externalities: a capital-stock externality and a portfolio externality. These hamper the ability of a benevolent government to make optimal borrowing and default decisions and are exacerbated during periods of distress. Competitive equilibria feature underinvestment, larger non-traded sectors, more default, and lower debt and consumption than a centralized planner's allocation.</description>
      <pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 2024 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
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      <dc:date>2024-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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