https://hdl.handle.net/10419/273252 Wed, 23 Sep 2026 01:19:56 GMT 2026-09-23T01:19:56Z https://hdl.handle.net/10419/339134 Title: Húsnæðislánamarkaður í spennitreyju krónu og fákeppni Authors: Thórólfur Matthiasson Thu, 01 Jan 2026 00:00:00 GMT https://hdl.handle.net/10419/339134 2026-01-01T00:00:00Z https://hdl.handle.net/10419/331459 Title: Verðbólgan 1992-2024 Authors: Guðmundur Guðmundsson Wed, 01 Jan 2025 00:00:00 GMT https://hdl.handle.net/10419/331459 2025-01-01T00:00:00Z https://hdl.handle.net/10419/339065 Title: Optimal taxation when access to income shifting is heterogeneous Authors: Arnaldur Sölvi Kristjánsson Abstract: This paper characterizes optimal labour and capital income taxation when access to income shifting opportunities is heterogeneous. I develop a two-period model in which individuals can reclassify labour income as capital income by paying a fixed cost (an extensive margin, e.g. incorporation or organisational changes) and a variable shifting cost (an intensive margin). In the benchmark without shifting, redistribution is implemented through the labour income tax while capital income is left untaxed. When shifting is possible, the optimal policy compresses the labour-capital tax wedge: stronger shifting responses call for lower labour income tax rates and higher capital income tax rates. Allowing the capital income tax to depend on reported labour income, the optimal capital tax schedule is progressive in reported labour income when shifting elasticities increase with income. A key implication is that extensive-margin participation receives disproportionate weight for capital taxation, whereas intensive and extensive responses affect the optimal labour tax symmetrically. Wed, 01 Jan 2025 00:00:00 GMT https://hdl.handle.net/10419/339065 2025-01-01T00:00:00Z https://hdl.handle.net/10419/339053 Title: Productivity or privilege: Game-theoretic and experimental models of social class Authors: Gunnthorsdottir, Anna; Pálmar Thorsteinsson Abstract: Social stratification, segregation and inequity invite concerns about fairness and social harmony. Our game-theoretic and experimental results indicate that they can also be detrimental to productivity, efficiency, and welfare. Class is defined by players' resources, incentives to make a public contribution, and social mobility. We discuss the model's real-world applications, and ways to increase efficiency and welfare through increased equity, mobility, or competition. We also describe how the model can be adapted to represent and experimentally test different class structures, the interaction between demographic characteristics and class, and the effectiveness of policies that modify incentives. We experimentally test a two-class model. The poorer L-class are socially mobile: for them, effort is linked to social positioning and earnings akin to what is often referred to as a Middle-Class mindset. The productive L-players support a relatively efficient equilibrium that encompasses both classes. Upper-class H-players, notwithstanding their guaranteed privilege and superior resources, are relatively unproductive and display behavior akin to classconsciousness by contributing only what is necessary to remain above the L-class. The experimental results confirm that humans respond swiftly to incentives associated with their material status and economic opportunities and suggest that policies aimed at increasing welfare through incentive modification can be successful. Wed, 01 Jan 2025 00:00:00 GMT https://hdl.handle.net/10419/339053 2025-01-01T00:00:00Z