https://hdl.handle.net/10419/263315 Sun, 15 Nov 2026 22:30:11 GMT 2026-11-15T22:30:11Z https://hdl.handle.net/10419/338241 Title: Entwicklungszusammenarbeit als Konfliktprävention? Was die Forschung sagt Authors: Fiedler, Charlotte; Lorch, Jasmin; Mross, Karina; Leininger, Julia Abstract: Zivile Krisenprävention ist von zentraler Bedeutung für das Leitbild der integrierten Sicherheit, an dem sich die Nationale Sicherheitsstrategie der Bundesregierung derzeit orientiert. Dies umfasst auch Konfliktprävention: Gewaltkonflikten mit zivilen Mitteln vorzubeugen oder sie einzudämmen. Konfliktprävention ist auch zentral, um die Außenpolitik der Bundesregierung als wehrhafte Friedenspolitik zu gestalten und das Prinzip zu stärken, Gewalt nur als Ultima Ratio einzusetzen. Dafür ist es wichtig zu wissen, ob und mit welchen Mitteln zivile Konfliktprävention wirkt. Hierfür fasst dieser Policy Brief wissenschaftliche Evidenz über die Wirksamkeit von Konfliktprävention durch Entwicklungszusammenarbeit (EZ) zusammen. Der Überblick zeigt, dass bestimmte EZ-Ansätze nachweisbar Konflikte verhindern oder abmildern können, EZ insgesamt aber nicht automatisch konfliktpräventiv wirkt. Eine Ausdifferenzierung nach verschiedenen Bereichen von EZ macht deutlich, dass vor allem Demokratie- und Friedensförderung konfliktpräventiv wirken. Verschiedene Formen von Gewalt wie Bürgerkrieg oder Wahlgewalt treten seltener auf, wenn in Demokratieförderung investiert wird. Friedensförderung kann maßgeblich den Wiederausbruch von Gewaltkonflikten verhindern, Friedensmissionen Todesopfer reduzieren oder Gewalt eindämmen. Für die EZ insgesamt sind derartige Effekte aber nicht nachgewiesen. Schlimmstenfalls kann EZ in Konfliktkontexten zur umkämpften Ressource werden und Gewalt befeuern. Schlecht geführte Projekte ohne Monitoring und solche, die nicht ausreichend kontextsensibel waren, haben Gewaltkonflikte begünstigt. Gleichzeitig wirken EZ-Schocks - abrupte Rückgänge von EZ - erwiesenermaßen konfliktfördernd. Soll EZ dabei unterstützen, Gewaltkonflikte zu verhindern oder einzudämmen, so muss sie bewusst auf diese Ziele ausgerichtet und mit den notwendigen Ressourcen ausgestattet werden. Außerdem sind gutes Projektmanagement und eine konfliktsensible Umsetzung für alle Arten von EZ maßgeblich, um nicht-intendierte konfliktfördernde Auswirkungen zu vermeiden. Es empfehlen sich folgende Handlungsgrundsätze: Friedens- und Demokratieförderung priorisieren und Ressourcen umsteuern. Um EZ als Konfliktprävention aufzustellen, empfiehlt es sich, Demokratie- und Friedensförderung prominenter auf die Agenda zu setzen und Mittel gezielt in diese Felder zu investieren. Analyseinstrumente schärfen und als Entscheidungsgrundlage nutzen. Die bestehenden Analyseinstrumente sollten in ihrem Fokus auf Konfliktprävention geschärft und konsequenter genutzt werden. Besondere Bedeutung kommt der strategischen Vorausschau zu, die Frühwarnung mit Szenarienarbeit kombiniert. Do-no-Harm durch EZ bleibt Handlungsmaxime. Exit-Schocks vermeiden. Wo EZ erheblich reduziert oder beendet werden soll, hilft die detaillierte Analyse möglicher konfliktverschärfender Auswirkungen im Vorhinein, um diese mit entsprechenden Übergangsstrategien abzufedern. Wo der Ausbruch oder die Eskalation von Gewalt als Folge wahrscheinlich sind, gilt es, geplante Rückzugsentscheidungen zu überdenken. Thu, 01 Jan 2026 00:00:00 GMT https://hdl.handle.net/10419/338241 2026-01-01T00:00:00Z https://hdl.handle.net/10419/340864 Title: Back to the future: The pact for the Mediterranean and the mirage of Euro-Mediterranean integration Authors: Furness, Mark Abstract: The European Union (EU) and southern Mediterranean partners launched the Pact for the Mediterranean in November 2025 to reset relations with the EU's "Southern Neighbourhood" in an increasingly challenging regional context. The Pact comes 30 years after the 1995 Barcelona Process promised to foster economic - and to a lesser degree political - integration in the Mediterranean Basin. The Pact's declared objective is to "achieve deeper integration within the common Mediterranean space" (EC & HR, 2025). This policy brief discusses the Pact's prospects for achieving this goal, which previous efforts have failed to reach. For long-time observers of Euro-Mediterranean relations, the Pact appears to be a "back to the future" approach. Its three substantive "pillars" (people, economies and security) echo the three "baskets" (political/ security, economic and socio-cultural) of the original Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. Structurally, it relies on the same mix of differentiated bilateral agreements (now termed "comprehensive partnerships") within a multilateral regional framework. The Pact's success depends on whether the EU and Mediterranean partner countries can resolve four core dilemmas that have long challenged their relations: The "autocracy dilemma": balancing the need to work with authoritarian governments with European interests in supporting democracy. The "migration dilemma": securing borders while respecting human rights. The "rentierism dilemma": finding solutions to immediate economic, social and environmental challenges while making necessary reforms to rentier political economies. The "regionalism dilemma": cutting bilateral deals while trying to build regional structures to address collective action problems. The term "pact" is normally used to describe an agreement between two partners, setting out agreed objectives and actions for both sides. The Pact for the Mediterranean is an EU policy framework that, at most, represents a tacit agreement with southern Mediterranean governments, without committing either side to policy changes or reforms that might have long-term implications. The Pact for the Mediterranean has potential to strengthen sectoral cooperation, for example on renewable energy, connectivity infrastructure and labour mobility. If accompanied by sufficient resources and mutual trust-building, this functional cooperation may create incentives for deeper integration. This, in turn, will still depend on whether the EU and southern Mediterranean governments can move beyond transactionalism and invest in partnerships between their societies: support for democratic movements and institutions, investment in public goods, protection of the natural environment and investment in collective regionalism. Thus far, there is little indication that the EU and southern Mediterranean governments will take advantage of this opportunity. Thu, 01 Jan 2026 00:00:00 GMT https://hdl.handle.net/10419/340864 2026-01-01T00:00:00Z https://hdl.handle.net/10419/341383 Title: Reality check on donor expectations: Do GovTech initiatives help autocrats? Authors: Sinanoglu, Semuhi; von Schiller, Armin Abstract: International donors commit substantial resources to GovTech projects (the application of information and communication technologies to government functions). World Bank GovTech investments alone have exceeded $118 billion over the last three decades. Donor strategy documents consistently frame digital transformation not only as a vehicle for improved effectiveness but also for strengthening democracy. Autocrats are equally invested in these tools. Globally, at least 88 authoritarian regimes currently operate GovTech projects, and electoral autocracies receive the largest share of GovTech aid (48.6 per cent of commitments). Beyond well-known surveillance applications, autocracies deploy GovTech for service delivery, grievance redress and even citizen engagement. These platforms are deployed to project an image of responsiveness and legitimacy. Our experimental evidence from Turkey shows how efficiency-enhancing GovTech tools, when paired with sophisticated regime communication, can durably entrench autocratic rule. We designed a survey experiment focused on CIMER, Turkey's widely used citizen petition platform, to examine how citizens respond to the government propaganda surrounding it. The results show that the government's framing of CIMER as an effective tool that "gets things done" significantly increased trust in authoritarian institutions, even among regime opponents. The effect extended beyond attitudes to behaviour: Asked to allocate a hypothetical donation of money among state institutions, independent non-governmental organisations (NGOs) or themselves, anti-government respondents exposed to messages on the platform were significantly more likely to give the money to state institutions. Our recommendations are as follows: Donors must take the second-order effects of GovTech initiatives seriously and develop mechanisms to carefully evaluate the risks of unintended consequences. In many cases, support for GovTech projects is overly optimistic regarding their effects on political openness. Adopting a more context-sensitive and realistic approach demands detailed political economy assessments before supporting GovTech projects and developing monitoring metrics that capture potential regime-legitimation effects. Donors need to build stronger safety guardrails into these projects. Depending on the political economy assessments, such measures could include the institutional involvement of international organisations or, if feasible, local NGOs (as conditionality) in platform oversight, mandatory independent audits and open data standards by design, among others. Finally, donors need to consider actively participating in public communication on these platforms, with visible donor branding, to counter government-controlled propaganda, claim credit for service delivery and strengthen trust in donor countries and organisations. Thu, 01 Jan 2026 00:00:00 GMT https://hdl.handle.net/10419/341383 2026-01-01T00:00:00Z https://hdl.handle.net/10419/340865 Title: Strengthening European development policy: The case for team Europe 2.0 Authors: Koch, Svea; Bergmann, Julian; Erforth, Benedikt; Hackenesch, Christine; Keijzer, Niels Abstract: The international order is undergoing profound change as rivalry among major powers realigns the global balance. This is also having an impact on European development policy. In many European Union (EU) member states, funding for official development assistance (ODA) is declining. At the same time, EU countries are reforming their development policies and increasingly channelling their remaining resources towards priorities that serve primarily their own interests. So far, these reforms have largely been defined bilaterally, whereas a political debate on the role, added value and joint objectives of EU development policy is largely absent. Yet, without strengthening European cooperation in development policy, Europe will not succeed in providing an adequate response to the current upheavals in global politics. In this policy brief, we argue that reform efforts in European development policy must strengthen cooperation and complementarity to respond effectively to the changed geopolitical landscape. Our analysis identifies four key policy areas where European actors are pursuing ongoing reforms and where development policy should make significant contributions: 1) promoting economic cooperation and privatesector engagement, 2) security policy, 3) managing and shaping migration and 4) human development including poverty reduction, particularly in least developed countries (LDCs). So far, a joint European strategic direction in these areas has been lacking. Negotiating these shared priorities requires a revitalisation of the political dialogue between EU institutions and member states, as well as further development of the "Team Europe" approach. "Team Europe 2.0" would then have two functions: to strengthen substantive complementarity "internally" through an understanding of how the various actors individually contribute to jointly defined objectives; and "externally" by making visible what Europe stands for strategically. A key element of Team Europe 2.0 should be an improved substantive dialogue among member states and within issue-specific, informal groups cofacilitated by individual member states and the European Commission. Such "thematic champions" could initiate the development of joint strategies for larger, transformative initiatives. Improved political dialogue and coordination on substance in key areas of European development policy are prerequisites for a united and more strategic external presence of "Team Europe", including in multilateral contexts. Thu, 01 Jan 2026 00:00:00 GMT https://hdl.handle.net/10419/340865 2026-01-01T00:00:00Z