https://hdl.handle.net/10419/252361 Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP), German Institute for International and Security Affairs, Berlin Sun, 15 Nov 2026 01:48:56 GMT 2026-11-15T01:48:56Z http://econstor.eu:80/retrieve/5b9fb07e-2352-4ed7-aa75-9fd09412ef36/SWP_Logo_fuer_Dritte_RGB_de.jpg https://hdl.handle.net/10419/252361 https://hdl.handle.net/10419/336785 Title: A fourth Saudi state: The crown prince's reforms in politics, society and the economy Authors: Steinberg, Guido Abstract: The political, social and economic reforms spearheaded by Saudi Crown Prince Muhammad Bin Salman serve the goal of consolidating his rule in the long term. Bin Salman has centralised decision-making in his own hands and is in full control of the country's politics. Authoritarianism under the crown prince is far more radical and uncompromising than was the case in Saudi Arabia until 2015. From the outset, Bin Salman promoted a pronounced Saudi nationalism, which many observers describe as a "Saudi-first" policy. From the crown prince's point of view, social and cultural liberalisation is a prerequisite for the success of his economic reforms and thus for the long-term survival of the kingdom and the ruling family. The reforms have had only limited success because Saudi Arabia remains highly dependent on oil revenues, despite a recent economic upturn. Thu, 01 Jan 2026 00:00:00 GMT https://hdl.handle.net/10419/336785 2026-01-01T00:00:00Z https://hdl.handle.net/10419/336773 Title: Sovereign wealth funds and foreign policy: How Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar invest in their power Authors: Roll, Stephan Abstract: Five of the world's most active and largest sovereign wealth funds are to be found in the Gulf Region: the Saudi Public Investment Fund (PIF), the Qatar Investment Authority (QIA) and the United Arab Emirates' Abu Dhabi Investment Authority (ADIA), Mubadala and ADQ. These funds not only serve to convert oil revenues into investment capital, thereby enabling the transition from rent-based to more diversified economies; they also contribute to expanding the foreign policy capabilities of the countries in which they are based. Institutional and personnel linkages enable the Saudi, Qatari and UAE governments to deploy their funds strategically, which, in turn, allows them to significantly expand their hard, soft, and sharp power - for example, through domestic and foreign investments in sectors such as armaments, media, sports and new technologies as well as through cooperation with politically influential actors. At the same time, the Gulf monarchies seek to portray their sovereign wealth funds as apolitical and purely profit-oriented - a narrative that is facilitated by the establishment of subsidiaries or cooperation with private equity firms. Understandably, Germany and its European partners have an interest in attracting sovereign wealth funds as investors, but they must not overlook the risks involved. These include third parties gaining access to critical infrastructure, sensitive military and security technology being leaked and the Gulf monarchies exercising political influence. Further, Germany and the EU must take a more fundamental look at how the three Gulf monarchies have increased their foreign policy options through the sovereign wealth funds. This is important as the actions of Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar - at both the regional and international level - are at times contrary to German and European interests. Thu, 01 Jan 2026 00:00:00 GMT https://hdl.handle.net/10419/336773 2026-01-01T00:00:00Z https://hdl.handle.net/10419/336781 Title: Deutsche Außenpolitik und das Leitbild der "regelbasierten internationalen Ordnung": Herausforderungen durch China, Russland und die USA Authors: Schaller, Christian Abstract: Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland versteht sich als Verteidigerin des Völkerrechts und bekennt sich zu einer "regelbasierten internationalen Ordnung" (rules-based international order). Dabei handelt es sich um ein politisches Konzept mit unscharfen Konturen, das neben völkerrechtlichen Normen auch rechtlich unverbindliche Regeln, Praktiken und Standards als Elemente der internationalen Ordnung einschließt. China und Russland stellen die regelbasierte Ordnung als ein westliches Konstrukt dar, das darauf abziele, Völkerrecht durch selbstgeschaffene und nicht allgemein legitimierte Regeln zu ersetzen. Westlichen Staaten gehe es darum, eigene Interessen mithilfe solcher Regeln durchzusetzen und gleichzeitig "Systemrivalen" Regelverstöße vorwerfen zu können. Auf die USA als einstigen Verfechter der rules-based order können sich Deutschland und Europa nicht mehr verlassen. Die Trump-Regierung untergräbt systematisch das Fundament, das eine solche Ordnung tragen soll; das Völkerrecht spielt für Trump weder als Maßstab außenpolitischen Handelns noch als strukturierender Faktor der internationalen Politik eine Rolle. Umso wichtiger ist es für die Bundesrepublik, die noch vorhandenen Strukturen einer regelbasierten Ordnung gemeinsam mit anderen Staaten zu erhalten und auszubauen. Vorrangiges Ziel muss es sein, das Völkerrecht als Kern dieser Ordnung zu stabilisieren. China beansprucht in Weltordnungsfragen für sich, als Interessenvertreter des Globalen Südens aufzutreten, und verfügt dabei inzwischen über erhebliche Diskursmacht. Als Gegenentwurf zum Modell der rules-based order propagiert Peking das Leitbild einer "völkerrechtsbasierten internationalen Ordnung". Vor diesem Hintergrund bedarf es einer vertieften Auseinandersetzung mit den chinesischen Ordnungsvorstellungen. Wie definiert Peking eine völkerrechtsbasierte internationale Ordnung? In welchen Punkten weicht dieses Verständnis von eigenen normativen Positionen ab, und welche Konsequenzen ergeben sich, wenn China Völkerrecht nach seiner Lesart durchsetzt? Thu, 01 Jan 2026 00:00:00 GMT https://hdl.handle.net/10419/336781 2026-01-01T00:00:00Z https://hdl.handle.net/10419/336746 Title: Feminist foreign policy in Latin America: Comparing Mexico, Chile and Colombia Authors: Zilla, Claudia; Peschke, Marie Abstract: In Latin America, Mexico (2020), Chile (2022) and Colombia (2022) have all officially committed to a feminist foreign policy (FFP). The introduction of a feminist approach to foreign policy should be seen in the context of a growing awareness of gender issues in international, regional and national politics. In comparison with their European counterparts, the Latin American approaches to FFP exhibit a stronger focus on the domestic dimension, on internal problems. This is especially clear in the case of Mexico, while Chile's FFP emphasises the feminist perspective in foreign trade and Colombia's FFP defines itself as pacifist. These countries' FFPs have not brought about a fundamental political change, but they do inject new momentum into existing gender equality policies and gender mainstreaming. They expand women's participation and representation and enhance the visibility of women's contribution to foreign policy. Mexico, Chile and Colombia are important partners for Germany and the EU in matters concerning the global gender and human rights agenda. As these Latin American countries are intensifying their cooperation in these areas, they are also worthwhile partners for the expansion of trilateral cooperation. As the German Federal Foreign Office has dropped its FFP, while the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) is continuing its feminist development policy and the future of Chile's FFP is uncertain due to the change of power, it will make sense to pursue cooperation on human rights, inclusion and gender issues through variable formats and terminological framing. Germany should also benefit from learning processes, and strengthen bi-regional dialogue and exchange, including between feminist and women's organisations. Thu, 01 Jan 2026 00:00:00 GMT https://hdl.handle.net/10419/336746 2026-01-01T00:00:00Z