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    <title>EconStor Collection:</title>
    <link>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/248127</link>
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    <pubDate>Thu, 30 Apr 2026 06:56:18 GMT</pubDate>
    <dc:date>2026-04-30T06:56:18Z</dc:date>
    <item>
      <title>From contractors to investors? Evolving engagement of Chinese state capital in global infrastructure development and the case of the Lekki Port in Nigeria</title>
      <link>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/268870</link>
      <description>Title: From contractors to investors? Evolving engagement of Chinese state capital in global infrastructure development and the case of the Lekki Port in Nigeria
Authors: Zhang, Hong
Abstract: Chinese companies have been seeking to climb up the value chain by becoming investors and operators of the infrastructure projects they are contracted to build. Despite their prominent market share in Africa as contractors, Chinese companies face a steep learning curve and have sought to work with other international actors from advanced economies. The industry's willingness to upgrade can harness a move away from China's lending practice that is overly reliant on sovereign loans. Host governments need to be realistic about the capabilities of Chinese companies as investors and operators, and push for localization and skill transfer.</description>
      <pubDate>Sun, 01 Jan 2023 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
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      <dc:date>2023-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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    <item>
      <title>Integrating China into multilateral debt relief: Progress and problems in the G20 DSSI</title>
      <link>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/290359</link>
      <description>Title: Integrating China into multilateral debt relief: Progress and problems in the G20 DSSI
Authors: Bräutigam, Deborah A.; Huang, Yufan
Abstract: On March 25, 2020, as the COVID-19 pandemic swept across the world, the heads of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank proposed that the leaders of the world's 20 largest economies, the Group of 20 (G20), provide breathing space by suspending the collection of debt service on official loans to 73 of the world's poorest countries. The G20 quickly launched the Debt Service Suspension Initiative (DSSI) on April 15, 2020. The DSSI was the first big test of the G20's global economic coordination leadership regarding low and middle-income country sovereign debt. The changing pattern of global credit demanded a new architecture for solving debt crises. Since 2008, the G20 has been the premier forum for international economic coordination, but the G20 had not previously worked with the Paris Club. The DSSI was intended by some of its designers to bring China into a well-oiled system for global sovereign debt governance, with the Common Framework as the scaffold upon which a new architecture would be built. Through analysis of available data, process-tracing through over 100 interviews with G20 participants and borrowers, and case studies, we argue, with some caveats, that China fulfilled its role fairly well as a responsible G20 stakeholder implementing the DSSI.</description>
      <pubDate>Sun, 01 Jan 2023 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
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      <dc:date>2023-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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    <item>
      <title>How Africa Borrows From China: And Why Mombasa Port is Not Collateral for Kenya's Standard Gauge Railway</title>
      <link>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/253389</link>
      <description>Title: How Africa Borrows From China: And Why Mombasa Port is Not Collateral for Kenya's Standard Gauge Railway
Authors: Brautigam, Deborah; Bhalaki, Vijay; Deron, Laure; Wang, Yinxuan
Abstract: In December 2018, rumors began circulating that Kenya had staked its valuable Mombasa Port as collateral for US$ 3.6 billion in Chinese loans for the Standard Gauge Railway (SGR). New research from CARI shows why the collateral rumor is wrong. A CARI team of scholars and practitioners of international commercial law, auditing, and project finance spent nearly two years collecting and investigating all available SGR contracts and documentation.1 Solving the mystery of the collateral rumor through reconstructing the contractual arrangements also allowed the team to diagram for the first time how China Eximbank and its borrowers structure financing relationships and payment flows in a large Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) project (Figure 1), blending project finance into sovereign loans. The collateral rumor originated in a critical mistake by Kenya's Auditor General (AG). In a routine audit, the AG wrongly labeled Kenya Ports Authority (KPA), owner of Mombasa Port, as a "borrower" responsible for repaying the China Eximbank SGR loans. The AG-and many others-also misunderstood the "waiver of sovereign immunity" clause signed by Kenya's National Treasury, KPA, and Kenya Railway Corporation (KRC). Instead of a deliberate debt trap, we find that the railway project was carefully and creatively designed to reduce the risks of a sovereign default and enhance the bankability of a project with high costs but significant long-term benefits for Kenya and the region.</description>
      <pubDate>Sat, 01 Jan 2022 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
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      <dc:date>2022-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Development Finance and Distributive Politics: Comparing Chinese and World Bank Finance in sub-Saharan Africa</title>
      <link>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/248233</link>
      <description>Title: Development Finance and Distributive Politics: Comparing Chinese and World Bank Finance in sub-Saharan Africa
Authors: Tang, Keyi
Abstract: When development finance becomes available to weak states, which parts of the state will receive the windfall gains? Development finance does not always reach the people who need it the most, both within and across countries. In this research, Keyi Tang examines how donors' preferences and recipient countries' regime types affect the subnational distribution of development finance. By combining a large-N analysis of Chinese and World Bank's loans and grants to 48 African countries between 2000-2012 and small-N case studies of a hybrid regime, Zambia, and an autocratic regime, Ethiopia, Keyi finds that domestic politics play a bigger role than donors' conditionality in development finance allocation. The more democratic a regime is, the more likely co-ethnic regions of the incumbent leader are to receive finance from both China and the World Bank. Democracy may not always help prevent clientelism but may actually facilitate it under weak institutions.</description>
      <pubDate>Fri, 01 Jan 2021 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://hdl.handle.net/10419/248233</guid>
      <dc:date>2021-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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