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    <title>EconStor Collection:</title>
    <link>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/215623</link>
    <description />
    <pubDate>Tue, 28 Apr 2026 10:14:59 GMT</pubDate>
    <dc:date>2026-04-28T10:14:59Z</dc:date>
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      <title>Because I (don't) deserve it: Entitlement and lying behavior</title>
      <link>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/219036</link>
      <description>Title: Because I (don't) deserve it: Entitlement and lying behavior
Authors: Fries, Tilman; Parra, Daniel
Abstract: This paper studies, theoretically and experimentally, whether the entitlement effect created by deservingness affects the willingness to lie. In a laboratory experiment, we compare the lying behavior of high-endowment participants with low-endowment participants. In one treatment, the allocation of the endowment is decided by participants' effort, and in the other, it is determined by a random draw. When participants lie to keep money directly determined by their effort, those who receive the high endowment lie more than those who receive the low endowment. In contrast, when income is determined by a random draw, lying is the same regardless of the endowment. These findings are consistent with our model of relative entitlement concerns where less deserving individuals are discouraged from lying because they believe that other individuals are more deserving than themselves.</description>
      <pubDate>Wed, 01 Jan 2020 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://hdl.handle.net/10419/219036</guid>
      <dc:date>2020-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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      <title>The limits of transparency as a means of reducing corruption</title>
      <link>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/215624</link>
      <description>Title: The limits of transparency as a means of reducing corruption
Authors: Parra, Daniel; Muñoz-Herrera, Manuel; Palacio, Luis
Abstract: We use a laboratory experiment to study the impact of transparency on reducing corruption in contexts where embezzlement and bribery can co-occur. These contexts are closely related to grand corruption settings, where different types of corruption occur and allow people in power to take advantage of their position. Transparency is expected to have a positive effect on reducing corruption. However, our results show that transparency decreases embezzlement by roughly 10 percentage points, while it has no significant effect on bribery. The observed differential impact of transparency could be attributed to strategic lying by the resource manager, who acts as if low public investment rates were a consequence of bad luck (low budget) instead of misappropriation. This suggests that the impact of transparency cannot be generalized to all types of corruption when different types co-exist.</description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 01 Jan 2019 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://hdl.handle.net/10419/215624</guid>
      <dc:date>2019-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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