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    <link>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/199123</link>
    <description />
    <pubDate>Mon, 14 Sep 2026 07:33:26 GMT</pubDate>
    <dc:date>2026-09-14T07:33:26Z</dc:date>
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      <title>Geopolitics and development in Central Asia: Exploring opportunities for middle powers</title>
      <link>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/337448</link>
      <description>Title: Geopolitics and development in Central Asia: Exploring opportunities for middle powers
Authors: Woo, Hyeyoung
Abstract: Central Asia has emerged as a key region where the convergence of geopolitics and development cooperation is most visible. Major powers are redefining their approaches: Japan combines official development assistance (ODA) with commercial partnerships to advance connectivity and reform; the EU is emphasising a sustainable infrastructure and governance-oriented approach; the US is expected to catalyse private investment rather than direct aid; China deepens its regional presence through the Belt and Road Initiative; while Russia leverages historical and security ties to maintain influence. Meanwhile, middle powers - countries that do not wield vast influence like major powers but possess substantial capacity to shape international events - are exploring new opportunities for engagement. Türkiye positions itself as a bridge between advanced economies and the Global South, emphasising connectivity and energy cooperation through the Middle Corridor and the Organization of Turkic States. South Korea's 2025 ODA Strategy for Central Asia identifies the region as a strategic partner for shared growth, integrating pragmatic diplomacy with value-based cooperation. By leveraging their soft power and policy experience, these middle powers offer a distinctive model for development partnership. Central Asian governments are responding to a changing international environment by diversifying partnerships through regional integration and more strategic engagement with development  partners.</description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 01 Jan 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://hdl.handle.net/10419/337448</guid>
      <dc:date>2026-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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    <item>
      <title>Beyond the wage channel: Climate-smart public works programmes and household resilience in Malawi</title>
      <link>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/339591</link>
      <description>Title: Beyond the wage channel: Climate-smart public works programmes and household resilience in Malawi
Authors: Sakketa, Tekalign Gutu; Burchi, Francesco; Schubert, Sophia; Makoka, Donald
Abstract: One of the main arguments for implementing public works programmes (PWPs) instead of other social protection schemes such as cash transfers is that the assets created through these programmes themselves can generate medium- to long-term benefits. This is particularly important as the costs for supervision and the construction materials can account for up to 70 per cent of programme budgets. Despite this, there is scarce empirical evidence on PWPs' effects through the "asset channel": indeed; most studies have focused solely on the traditional "wage channel". To bridge this gap, this paper examines whether and how assets created under Malawi's Climate-Smart Enhanced Public Works Programme (CS-EPWP) - a programme recently implemented by the government of Malawi and funded by the World Bank - strengthen the resilience of households to climate shocks such as droughts and floods. The paper relies on case study analysis using primary qualitative data based on focus group discussions and key informant interviews with different stakeholders at the national, district and community levels. Interviews were conducted during fieldwork in September 2024 in two southern districts of Malawi highly affected by climate change. The analysis is complemented by site visits and quantitative survey data on asset quality. By combining these methods, we find that the CS-EPWP generates durable, community-maintained assets, which in turn enhance households' capacity to cope with and adapt to climate shocks. In particular, land-based assets provide multiple benefits for both households and communities, while forest-based interventions are expected to generate similar long-term gains, though further research is needed to confirm their (long-term) impacts. To maximise the impact of climate-smart public works programmes, policymakers and donors should align asset creation with climate objectives and adopt participatory approaches to ensure their relevance, maintenance and long-term sustainability.</description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 01 Jan 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://hdl.handle.net/10419/339591</guid>
      <dc:date>2026-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>What do the 2015 SDG negotiations teach us for a beyond-2030 framework?</title>
      <link>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/337447</link>
      <description>Title: What do the 2015 SDG negotiations teach us for a beyond-2030 framework?
Authors: von Haaren, Paula; Berger, Axel
Abstract: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development - the global framework establishing 17 universal and interconnected goals to guide sustainable development efforts - was adopted in 2015 following a uniquely participative and ambitious process. A decade on, it is increasingly evident that most of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) are unlikely to be achieved by 2030 as originally envisioned. Discussions about a follow-up framework beyond 2030 are gaining momentum ahead of the SDG Summit in September 2027. This paper evaluates the process design, inclusiveness, negotiating strategies, fora and fault lines in 2015 and discusses to what extent the lessons learned can be applied to negotiations for a potential follow-up framework. We find that several process design elements and negotiation strategies, as well as actor composition, fostered trust and ownership, reduced polarisation and enabled agreements on ambitious targets. In particular, the process benefited from the inclusion of diverse, non-hierarchical actor communities, a long, science-based stocktaking phase, the breaking up of traditional negotiating blocks, transparency, and emphasis on common interests. We also identify several recurring fault lines that are overwhelmingly still relevant today. Apart from the above best practices of the process leading to the adoption of the SDGs in 2015, we identify several shortcomings that should be addressed in the beyond-2030 negotiations: inefficiencies due to competing tracks for the development of the goals; top-down agenda-setting processes leading to less ambitious outcomes; barriers to participation of and accountability towards some marginalised and informal actors; and the watering down of goals and indicators - including non-tangible targets and unresolved inconsistencies and trade-offs within the agenda. Finally, the paper argues that the beyond-2030 negotiations will take place in a context that is similar to the process that led to the SDGs but is nevertheless in many ways more challenging than in 2015, amidst intensifying crises, political shifts and loss of trust.</description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 01 Jan 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://hdl.handle.net/10419/337447</guid>
      <dc:date>2026-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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    <item>
      <title>International development cooperation and the emerging global order</title>
      <link>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/342472</link>
      <description>Title: International development cooperation and the emerging global order
Editors: Furness, Mark; Keijzer, Niels
Abstract: A little more than a year into the Trump 2.0 era, the "post-Cold War" international order as we know it is coming to an end. Amid increasing volatility and conflict, the shape and character of the order that will replace it are dangerously unclear. There are ambitions by so-called middle powers - including some member states of the EU - to provide an effective response, but questions remain as to their potential impact. Three scenarios can be envisaged: (1) an Orwellian dystopia dominated by three global powers - the United States, China and Russia - each with its own sphere of influence; (2) a "new Cold War" between two rival capitalist models: "Western" liberal democracy versus "Eastern" oligarchy and (3) the survival of the rules-based international order, possibly as a counterweight to oligarchic spheres of influence. For this scenario to materialise, middle powers must address the liberal order's inherent weaknesses so that it delivers for all of its members. This discussion paper brings together 14 contributions drawing on the German Institute of Development and Sustainability's (IDOS) broad regional and thematic expertise to examine these questions. The contributions analyse key actors, cooperation themes and regions. Each contribution analyses the implications of the changing global order for its specific area of focus and explores how international cooperation in general - and development cooperation in particular - can contribute to a more just and sustainable international system. The paper aims to provide readers with a range of perspectives on the state of international development cooperation and its possible evolution. Taken together, the contributions provide insights into the roles that international development cooperation may play in an emerging global order and identify priorities for reforms.</description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 01 Jan 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://hdl.handle.net/10419/342472</guid>
      <dc:date>2026-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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