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    <link>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/180401</link>
    <description />
    <pubDate>Tue, 28 Apr 2026 11:25:41 GMT</pubDate>
    <dc:date>2026-04-28T11:25:41Z</dc:date>
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      <title>The Government Spending Multiplier at the Zero Lower Bound: International Evidence from Historical Data</title>
      <link>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/181524</link>
      <description>Title: The Government Spending Multiplier at the Zero Lower Bound: International Evidence from Historical Data
Authors: Klein, Mathias; Winkler, Roland
Abstract: Based on a large historical panel dataset, this paper provides robust evidence that the government spending multiplier is significantly higher when interest rates are at, or near, the zero lower bound. We estimate fiscal multipliers that are around 1.5 during zero lower bound episodes and significantly below unity outside of it. We show that the difference in multipliers is not driven by multipliers being higher during periods of economic slack.</description>
      <pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 2018 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://hdl.handle.net/10419/181524</guid>
      <dc:date>2018-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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    <item>
      <title>Leadership in a Dynamic Public Goods Game: An Experimental Study</title>
      <link>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/181599</link>
      <description>Title: Leadership in a Dynamic Public Goods Game: An Experimental Study
Authors: Eichenseer, Michael; Moser, Johannes
Abstract: We examine how leadership affects a dynamic public goods game. Using a setting where cooperation gains can be reinvested, our findings suggest that leadership has a positive impact on final wealth. Somewhat surprisingly, leadership also has a positive impact on reducing inequality within groups as measured by the Gini index. Based on a sequential prisoner's dilemma, we elicit types for conditional cooperation. Our results indicate that groups work best when led by cooperatively inclined individuals. Furthermore, early contributions by the leader are crucial and yield a high return.</description>
      <pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 2018 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://hdl.handle.net/10419/181599</guid>
      <dc:date>2018-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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      <title>Redistribution, Selection, and Trade</title>
      <link>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/181538</link>
      <description>Title: Redistribution, Selection, and Trade
Authors: Kohl, Miriam
Abstract: This paper examines the distributional effects of international trade in a general equilibrium model with heterogeneous agents and a welfare state redistributing income. The redistribution scheme is financed by a progressive income tax and gives the same absolute transfer to all individuals. Ceteris paribus, international trade leads to an increase in income per capita but also to higher income inequality on two fronts. Inter-group inequality between managers and workers increases, and intra-group inequality within the group of managers goes up as well. We show that for a given tax rate, there is an endogenous increase in the size of the welfare state that works against the increase in inequality, yet cannot offset it. The paper also sheds light on the conditions under which trade can actually lead to a Pareto improvement.</description>
      <pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 2018 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
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      <dc:date>2018-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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      <title>Does high growth persist? A focus on growth formulas and the influence of firm exits</title>
      <link>https://hdl.handle.net/10419/181595</link>
      <description>Title: Does high growth persist? A focus on growth formulas and the influence of firm exits
Authors: Erhardt, Eva
Abstract: This study investigates the development of firms after high-growth. We argue that the formula used for measuring growth determines results. Implications from different formulas are tested with data from Amadeus on Bulgarian firms for the years 2001-2010. We provide first evidence for an absolute growth formula and its systematic comparison to alternative choices. The focus is on growth in employees, but we offer additional evidence for sales and profits. Using a two-part regression model with separate equations for survival and growth, we find that high-growth does not persist when size of exits is accounted for. Losses by exiting high-growth firms outweigh further gains in size by survivors. This result equally holds for the 1 percent fastest growers in absolute terms, the top 1 percent in terms of log growth and high-growth firms defined according to Eurostat-OECD. Implications for the future study of high-growth firms and policies focused at them are discussed.</description>
      <pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 2018 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
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      <dc:date>2018-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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